Chambers v. Nasa Federal Credit Union
222 F. Supp. 3d 1
| D.D.C. | 2016Background
- Plaintiff Mary Chambers alleges NASA Federal Credit Union (NFCU) charged a $32 overdraft fee on a $59.99 debit transaction even though her ledger/actual balance ($67.74) could cover it; NFCU apparently used her available balance to assess the overdraft.
- Chambers contends two documents—the general Account Agreement and the federally required Opt‑In (overdraft consent) form—promised overdraft fees would be charged only when a transaction overdrew the actual/ledger balance.
- NFCU moved to dismiss, arguing both agreements unambiguously tie overdraft liability to the account’s available (not ledger) balance and that the opt‑in form (if executed) secured affirmative consent required by Regulation E.
- The Court considered contract interpretation rules, choice‑of‑law principles (Maryland law for the Account Agreement; D.C. law for the Opt‑In and quasi‑contract claims), and Regulation E’s opt‑in notice requirements.
- The Court concluded the Account Agreement and Opt‑In unambiguously use and explain "available" balance in assessing overdrafts, dismissing most claims premised on an alleged promise to use the actual balance.
- The Court allowed to proceed only Chambers’ alternative Regulation E theory that NFCU may have failed to provide or obtain a required opt‑in form (i.e., she pleads she never executed the opt‑in); that claim survives dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether contract(s) promised overdrafts would be measured by actual/ledger balance | Chambers: account documents promised fees only when actual/ledger balance was insufficient | NFCU: agreements unambiguously refer to and use available balance | Court: Agreements unambiguously tie overdrafts to available balance; breach of contract claim dismissed |
| Whether the Opt‑In form creates a contract and its interpretive weight | Chambers: Opt‑In governs overdraft consent and is a contract | NFCU: Opt‑In is a regulatory form but its terms are relevant | Court: Opt‑In constitutes a contract (acceptance creates obligation) and its language supports NFCU |
| Choice of law for agreements and extra‑contract claims | Chambers: Opt‑In governed by D.C. law; Account Agreement by Maryland law | NFCU: Account Agreement governed by Maryland law; did not press on Opt‑In | Court: Account Agreement governed by Maryland law; Opt‑In and unjust enrichment/money had and received governed by D.C. law |
| Compliance with Regulation E: adequacy of opt‑in notice and whether NFCU provided it | Chambers: Opt‑In was misleading if it described ledger‑based program; alternatively she never received/executed the opt‑in | NFCU: Opt‑In mirrors model language and (as written) references available balance; also contends she executed it | Court: Opt‑In, as written, described an available‑balance based service (so not misleading), but Chambers plausibly alleged she never received/executed the opt‑in form; Regulation E claim survives only on the failure‑to‑provide/obtain theory |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (establishes plausibility standard for federal complaints)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (clarifies pleading standards for legal conclusions vs. factual allegations)
- Cinciarelli v. Carter, 662 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (acceptance of an offer creates a binding contract)
- Myers v. Kayhoe, 892 A.2d 520 (Md. 2006) (Maryland rule: contracts interpreted objectively by court when unambiguous)
- Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 768 A.2d 620 (Md. 2001) (court determines contract ambiguity)
- Wright v. Howard Univ., 890 A.2d 194 (D.C. 2006) (every contract includes an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing)