Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whiting
131 S. Ct. 1968
| SCOTUS | 2011Background
- Congress enacted IRCA, establishing a federal framework to prohibit knowingly employing unauthorized aliens and to require employer verification via 1-9 forms.
- IRCA preempts state sanctions on employers for hiring unauthorized aliens, except through licensing and similar laws, under 1324a(h)(2).
- Arizona enacted the Legal Arizona Workers Act, suspending/revoking licenses of employers who knowingly/ Intentionally hire unauthorized aliens and mandating use of E-Verify.
- Arizona requires verification of work authorization via E-Verify and relies on federal determinations under 8 U.S.C. §1373(c) for eligibility status.
- Chamber of Commerce filed suit arguing express/implied preemption; lower courts held the law within the saving clause and not preempted.
- The Supreme Court majority held that Arizona licensing provisions fall within the saving clause and are not preempted; dissents argued saving clause should be read narrowly and also that E-Verify mandate is preempted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether IRCA's saving clause preempts Arizona licensing sanctions. | Chamber argues saving clause too narrow. | Arizona law fits within licensing/similar laws. | Arizona licensing sanctions not preempted |
| Whether IRCA impliedly preempts Arizona's licensing provisions due to conflict with federal law. | Arizona undermines federal scheme and balance. | Arizona closely tracks IRCA and avoids conflict. | Not impliedly preempted |
| Whether Arizona's E-Verify mandate is impliedly preempted. | Mandatory E-Verify disrupts Congress's voluntary scheme. | Arizona's use of E-Verify is consistent with federal aims and does not conflict. | E-Verify mandate pre-empted |
| Whether the scope of 'licensing and similar laws' in IRCA is too broad to include corporate charters and unrelated licenses. | Saving clause should be narrowly construed. | License-related definitions include broad state authorizations. | Saving clause covers broad license-like authorizations |
| Whether the state's adjudicatory process in determining unauthorized employment conflicts with federal adjudication. | State processes usurp federal determination and use of 1-9 evidence. | State relies on federal determinations and provides affirmative defenses mirroring IRCA. | No conflict; state uses federal determinations |
Key Cases Cited
- De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (U.S. 1976) (states have police power to regulate employment within their borders)
- Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (U.S. 2001) (preemption not implied by general federal program unless clear conflict)
- Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U.S. 88 (U.S. 1992) (high preemption threshold; not easily implicated by local regulation)
- Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (U.S. 2000) (statutory text and purpose control over preemption analysis)
- Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 562 U.S. 323 (U.S. 2011) (voluntary federal program not displaced by state choice effects)