254 So. 3d 1056
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2018Background
- In 2006 Turgman formed 1501 Ocean Drive, LLC and Chakra 5, Inc. to operate a Miami Beach nightclub (the Club); Appellants allege City code enforcement engaged in a multi-year campaign of pretextual inspections, fines, closures, and extortion aimed at forcing payments and shutting the Club down.
- Specific alleged conduct includes delayed permitting, repeated inspections and shutdowns, a November 2008 cease-and-desist closure, tax/fine pressure in 2010, and solicited bribes beginning in 2011; some individual City employees were later criminally prosecuted.
- Appellants sued the City in 2013 and filed an amended § 1983 complaint (procedural and substantive due process claims) in 2015; the trial court dismissed the City with prejudice, citing futility and that many acts predated the four-year limitations period.
- On appeal, the court considered (1) whether two corporate plaintiffs’ administrative dissolution barred appeal (they were later reinstated), (2) statute-of-limitations accrual and the continuing-tort issue, and (3) whether the amended complaint stated § 1983 claims for substantive and procedural due process against the City.
- The appellate court affirmed dismissal of claims based on events before May 20, 2009 (time barred) and affirmed dismissal of all substantive due process claims; it reversed dismissal of procedural due process claims based on events after May 20, 2009 (and undated events), remanding for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Effect of administrative dissolution on appealability | Chakra 5 and 1501 argued reinstatement cures litigious disability; appeal should proceed | City argued corporate dissolution barred suit/appeal or, alternatively, dismissal should be affirmed on that ground | Denied dismissal of appeal; entities had been reinstated and Venegas requires abatement not immediate dismissal, so tipsy-coachman defense fails |
| Statute of limitations / accrual for § 1983 claims | Appellants argued continuing tort tolled limitations, saving pre-2009 claims | City argued each discrete act accrued when it occurred and pre-2009 acts are time barred | Pre-2009 claims are time barred because each discrete injury accrued when known; continuing-tort doctrine did not apply to convert discrete acts into single continuing violation (majority) |
| Availability of substantive due process relief | Appellants asserted a liberty/property interest in pursuing their business free from corrupt enforcement | City argued land-use/zoning and other state-created regulatory rights are executive/state-law interests, not substantive federal due process rights | Substantive due process claim dismissed with prejudice; enforcement of municipal regulations is an executive/state-created right and only procedural due process is available |
| Availability of procedural due process relief | Appellants alleged deprivation of property interest by City action without adequate process due to a pattern of enforcement and extortion | City argued pleading/record lacked detail to show inadequate process and that claims were meritless | Procedural due process claims based on post-May 20, 2009 (and undated) events survived dismissal; dismissal with prejudice was reversed and case remanded for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (accrual for § 1983 claim when plaintiff knows of injury and who inflicted it)
- Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir.) (state four-year limitations period applies to § 1983 claims)
- McKinney v. McElhenney, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (executive violations of state-created rights give rise to procedural— not substantive—due process claims)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (municipal liability requires policy/ deliberate indifference causing constitutional deprivation)
- Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286 (limits on substantive due process recognition for occupational rights)
- DeKalb Stone, Inc. v. County of DeKalb, 106 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 1997) (land-use/zoning enforcement is executive action; no substantive due process)
- Amin Ijbara Equity Corp. v. Village of Oak Lawn, 860 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 2017) (each act of municipal harassment inflicts an immediate cognizable injury for accrual)
- Eisenberg v. City of Miami Beach, 54 F. Supp. 3d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (similar municipal code-enforcement/extortion allegations failed as substantive due process claims)