392 F. Supp. 3d 1
D.C. Cir.2019Background
- Plaintiffs (including Kayla and Chana Sitzman) were born abroad and claimed U.S. citizenship at birth under 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) because both parents were U.S. citizens and one parent allegedly had a prior U.S. "residence."
- The State Department issued CRBAs in 2006 based on consulate guidance then in effect, but later revoked the Sitzmans' CRBAs, concluding the parents’ prior U.S. visits did not constitute "residence."
- The Sitzmans sought administrative review via a hearing officer who recommended restoring the CRBAs; the Deputy Assistant Secretary reversed, applying a multifactor (not mere physical presence) test for "residence."
- Plaintiffs sued under the APA and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause challenging (1) the Department’s current interpretation of "residence" and (2) the revocation of previously issued CRBAs.
- The Government argued (a) § 1503 provides an adequate alternative remedy for those abroad and thus precludes APA review, and (b) the Department’s interpretation (residence > fleeting presence) is lawful.
- The Court held § 1503(b)/(c) does not bar APA or due process claims here, but ruled for the Government on the merits: "residence" requires more than mere brief physical presence and revocation of the CRBAs was lawful.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1503(b)/(c) precludes APA claims by persons abroad | § 1503 is not an exclusive remedy; APA relief remains available | § 1503(b)/(c) provides an adequate alternative judicial path and thus bars APA review | Court: § 1503(b)/(c) does NOT preclude APA or due process claims (Cort governs) |
| Meaning of "residence" in 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) | "Residence" = any physical presence (even 1 day) when both parents are citizens | "Residence" means "place of general abode"/"principal, actual dwelling place"—requires more than fleeting presence | Court: "Residence" requires more than fleeting physical presence; Department's reading is correct |
| Deference to State Department interpretations (FAM / Deputy Assistant Secretary decision) | Prior consular practice supporting brief presence should control; agency guidance not entitled to Chevron | Agency's adjudicative interpretation and FAM are entitled at least some deference; the Deputy Assistant Secretary reasoned consistently with statute | Court: Even if no Chevron deference, Department's interpretation best fits statute; outcome same |
| Lawfulness of revoking previously issued CRBAs | Revocations arbitrary; prior agency practice estops Department or requires prospective-only change | Department may correct erroneously issued CRBAs under 8 U.S.C. § 1504(a); no revocation of actual citizenship occurred | Court: Revocations lawful — Department properly rescinded documents wrongly issued; fairness/policy concerns are for agency/Congress |
Key Cases Cited
- Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962) (Supreme Court held § 1503(b)/(c) does not exclusively preclude other judicial review for persons abroad denied citizenship documentation)
- Xia v. Tillerson, 865 F.3d 643 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (administrative revocation of passport/CRBA affects only document; citizenship status not extinguished by revocation)
- Hinojosa v. Horn, 896 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2018) (panel held § 1503 provides an adequate alternative remedy, but court here found it unpersuasive)
- Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (discusses APA review scope and principle that special statutory review can preclude APA only with clear legislative intent)
- FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (agencies must acknowledge and explain policy changes; cannot depart from prior policy sub silentio)