768 F.3d 183
2d Cir.2014Background
- Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield County purchased a historic house in Litchfield, CT to serve as a place of worship and sought a certificate of appropriateness under Connecticut’s historic-district statute to alter the property.
- The Borough of Litchfield Historic District Commission (HDC) reviewed the proposal in multiple hearings, scrutinized design details and size, and denied the application while offering limited alternative accommodations (smaller addition, stained glass, reduced finial).
- The Chabad and its president, Rabbi Joseph Eisenbach, sued under RLUIPA, the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983/1985/1986, Connecticut law, and state religious-freedom statutes; the United States intervened below only to defend RLUIPA’s constitutionality.
- The district court dismissed Rabbi Eisenbach for lack of standing under RLUIPA and granted summary judgment to defendants on most claims, holding the Connecticut historic-district scheme neutral and generally applicable and rejecting RLUIPA equal-terms and nondiscrimination claims.
- On appeal, the Second Circuit: (1) vacated the dismissal of Rabbi Eisenbach’s RLUIPA standing (holding Article III standing satisfied and statutory entitlement a merits question), (2) held the HDC’s review constituted an “individualized assessment” under RLUIPA (triggering the substantial-burden provision) and remanded that claim, (3) affirmed dismissal of the equal-terms claim (no adequate comparator), and (4) vacated and remanded the nondiscrimination claim for proper intent-based analysis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether RLUIPA’s substantial-burden provision applies to HDC review | Chabad: HDC’s case-by-case, subjective review of proposed exterior changes imposed an individualized assessment triggering RLUIPA § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) | Defendants: Connecticut historic-district statute is neutral and generally applicable and thus cannot impose a RLUIPA substantial burden as a matter of law | Held: HDC review is an individualized assessment; RLUIPA substantial-burden provision applies; remanded to determine if a substantial burden in fact exists |
| Whether Chabad stated an equal-terms RLUIPA claim | Chabad: HDC treated it worse than secular institutions (cites Wolcott Library & others) | Defendants: Comparators are not similarly situated; earlier approvals occurred under different regimes | Held: Affirmed for defendants — Chabad failed to produce a valid, similarly situated secular comparator |
| Whether Chabad stated a nondiscrimination RLUIPA claim | Chabad: HDC discriminated on basis of religion/denomination in its treatment | Defendants: Decisions driven by neutral concerns (size, historic character), not religion | Held: Vacated and remanded — nondiscrimination claim requires intent-based (Arlington Heights–style) inquiry; identical comparators not required; district court must consider circumstantial/direct evidence of discriminatory intent |
| Whether Rabbi Eisenbach had standing to sue under RLUIPA | Eisenbach: Alleged intent to reside/benefit from proposed facilities; suffered concrete injury from denial and conditions | Defendants: Eisenbach lacked a RLUIPA-defined property interest (ownership/lease/etc.), so no standing | Held: Vacated district court’s dismissal — Article III standing satisfied; whether RLUIPA’s statutory prerequisites (property interest) are met is a merits question for remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (individualized-exemption principles inform scrutiny for burdens on religious exercise)
- Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (disparate effects and intent analysis for laws targeting religion)
- Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (sensitive inquiry into circumstantial and direct evidence of discriminatory intent)
- Westchester Day School v. Village of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2007) (factors to consider in RLUIPA substantial-burden context)
- Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner, 694 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2012) (analysis of substantial burden and nexus to religious exercise)
- Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2004) (individualized-assessment regimes trigger RLUIPA)
- Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2005) (RLUIPA protects against delegation of standardless discretion that masks discrimination)
- Bethel World Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery County Council, 706 F.3d 548 (4th Cir. 2013) (nondiscrimination/substantial-burden analyses and evidentiary considerations)
- Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014) (distinguishing Article III standing from statutory cause-of-action limits)