Ceynar v. Tesoro Logistics LP
2017 ND 112
N.D.2017Background
- David and Virginia Ceynar own land adjacent to a section-line highway in McKenzie County; a 1982 deed granted the County an easement "for highway purposes" expanding the statutory right-of-way to 75 feet from centerline.
- Tesoro operates the nearby Blue Buttes Station oil-truck offloading facility; congestion and safety concerns arose from trucks queuing on the highway to access the station.
- The County discovered its easement encompassed room to expand the road; Tesoro agreed to pay the County $67,851.70 to construct a truck lane on the easement area. Construction proceeded without further agreement from the Ceynars.
- The lane is maintained by the County and is open to public use; trucks primarily use it to exit the highway to the station and for temporary waiting, with drivers required to remain in vehicles while idling.
- The Ceynars sued for trespass, nuisance, and declaratory relief, arguing the lane exceeds the easement’s highway-only scope; the district court granted summary judgment for Tesoro and the County.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the lane falls within the 1982 easement "for use as a public highway" | Ceynar: Use exceeds easement because lane is used for "temporary truck parking," not public highway use | Tesoro/County: Lane is a highway-related traffic regulation measure; public highway includes areas open for lawful use even if primary users are trucks | Court: Lane is within the easement; use is consistent with highway purpose (traffic regulation, temporary stopping permitted) |
| Whether temporary parking/standing on the lane changes the character of the easement and requires compensation | Ceynar: Parking materially increases burden and changes character of easement beyond original dedication | Tesoro/County: Short-term stopping/standing is inherent to highway use and within County police powers to regulate traffic | Court: Temporary stopping is incidental to highway use; not a material change requiring compensation |
| Whether statutory definitions (N.D.C.C. § 24-01-01.1) govern easement interpretation | Ceynar: Interpretation should rely on plain easement language limiting use to public highway | Tesoro/County: District court applied statutory definitions to define highway scope | Court: Declined to base interpretation solely on statute; analyzed easement and precedent to determine scope but reached same practical result |
| Whether lane construction constituted a taking requiring compensation | Ceynar: County effectively took property by constructing lane without compensation beyond the 1982 grant | Tesoro/County: Predecessor granted an easement for compensation in 1982; current use falls within that easement | Court: No taking claim—easement grant resolved the right; claim without merit |
Key Cases Cited
- Krenz v. XTO Energy, Inc., 2017 ND 19, 890 N.W.2d 222 (explains easement as an interest in land and summarizes contract-style rules for interpreting grants)
- Riverwood Commercial Park, LLC v. Standard Oil Co., Inc., 2011 ND 95, 797 N.W.2d 770 (contracts and interests in land interpreted by mutual intent; guide to contract construction)
- Horob v. Zavanna, LLC, 2016 ND 168, 883 N.W.2d 855 (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Yegen v. City of Bismarck, 291 N.W.2d 422 (N.D. 1980) (use of streets and municipal police powers to regulate traffic relevant to assessing permissible easement uses)
- Donovan v. Allert, 91 N.W. 441 (N.D. 1902) (establishes principle that primary use of a street is passage/motion and nonconforming uses may exceed original dedication)