Cervantes v. Ardagh Grp.
914 F.3d 560
7th Cir.2019Background
- Cervantes worked at Ardagh from 1991, became an electro-mechanic, and in 2015 was disciplined and demoted to forklift driver after an incident where he remained after his shift to help his father and did not respond to a supervisor's radio calls.
- On Sept. 3, 2015 Cervantes filed an IDHR charge checking only the "Retaliation" box; the charge described discipline, harassment, demotion, and referenced a family member's earlier EEOC charge.
- Cervantes later, through counsel, submitted an ex parte letter to the IDHR mentioning alleged race-based denial of promotion, but Ardagh was not put on notice of those race/national-origin allegations during the administrative process.
- Cervantes sued in district court alleging Title VII and IHRA claims for race and national-origin discrimination and retaliation; the district court granted Ardagh summary judgment and Cervantes appealed.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed: (1) Cervantes failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his race and national-origin discrimination claims because they were not reasonably related to his IDHR retaliation charge; and (2) his retaliation claim failed because he did not engage in protected activity to anyone at Ardagh and supervisors lacked knowledge of any complaints, so no causal link existed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Cervantes exhausted administrative remedies for race/national-origin discrimination | Cervantes argues his IDHR retaliation charge and counsel's follow-up letter reasonably related to race/national-origin claims | Ardagh argues the IDHR charge checked only "retaliation," omitted race/national-origin, and counsel's ex parte letter did not notify employer | Court: No exhaustion; discrimination claims not reasonably related to the retaliation charge and counsel's letter did not provide employer notice |
| Whether the IDHR charge and later counsel letter expanded the charge to include discrimination claims | Cervantes claims the letter alerted IDHR to race-based promotion denial and should expand the charge | Ardagh contends the letter was ex parte and did not give employer notice; counsel framed allegations as part of retaliation theory | Court: Letter submitted ex parte cannot enlarge charge as to employer; assisted plaintiff required more specificity; charge not expanded |
| Whether Cervantes engaged in statutorily protected activity for retaliation | Cervantes contends he complained about discrimination and was retaliated against | Ardagh notes Cervantes testified he only complained to the union president and did not notify Ardagh supervisors | Court: No protected activity to employer; complaints to union president alone do not constitute protected activity to employer |
| Whether there is causal connection between protected activity and adverse action | Cervantes argues discipline/demotion followed his complaints | Ardagh argues supervisors were unaware of complaints so could not be motivated by them | Court: No causal connection because decisionmakers lacked knowledge of any complaints; retaliation claim fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Sitar v. Indiana Dep't of Transp., 344 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2003) (limits plaintiff to claims in administrative charge or those reasonably related)
- Rush v. McDonald's Corp., 966 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1992) (charge exhaustion provides employer notice and opportunity to conciliate)
- Conner v. Illinois Dep't of Natural Res., 413 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2005) (claims are reasonably related if they describe same circumstances and participants)
- O'Rourke v. Continental Cas. Co., 983 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1993) (ex parte submissions to agency do not notify employer and cannot enlarge employer's notice)
- Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., Inc., 840 F.3d 378 (7th Cir. 2016) (elements required to state a Title VII retaliation claim)
- King v. Ford Motor Co., 872 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2017) (no retaliation where decisionmakers lacked knowledge of protected activity)
- Gleason v. Mesirow Fin., Inc., 118 F.3d 1134 (7th Cir. 1997) (complaints not raised to anyone in authority are not protected activity)