Ceruolo v. Garcia
AC 16-P-1443
Mass. App. Ct.Sep 7, 2017Background
- After a bitter divorce, David Ceruolo sued his ex-wife Lyllian Ceruolo and her mother Martha Garcia for defamation and emotional distress based on statements made during and, he alleged, after the divorce.
- Defendants timely filed an anti‑SLAPP special motion to dismiss under G. L. c. 231, § 59H; the judge considered pleadings and affidavits and dismissed claims based on statements made during the divorce, leaving open claims based on post‑decree conduct.
- Defendants served a Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement; procedural delays and docketing errors followed, and the defendants’ counsel was not properly listed or notified of some orders.
- Plaintiff requested entry of default; the clerk entered default (March 26, 2015) but did not notify defendants; plaintiff later moved for assessment of damages and obtained a default judgment for $100,000 plus interest.
- Defendants moved to vacate the entry of default; the motion judge applied the wrong legal standard (excusable neglect) and denied relief; a second judge later held a damages hearing and entered judgment; the Appeals Court vacated the judgment and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the entry of default should be vacated | David implicitly argued default was proper and judgment should stand | Defendants argued default should be set aside because counsel had appeared, filed motions, and lacked notice of the default and orders | Vacated the judgment and remanded: default should have been considered under Rule 55(c) "good cause" standard rather than excusable neglect; errors require further proceedings |
| Standard applicable to vacating an entry of default | Not directly contested | Defendants: Rule 55(c) "good cause" applies to setting aside entry of default (more liberal) | Court: Agreed — Rule 55(c) "good cause" (not Rule 60(b) excusable neglect) governs and is to be applied liberally to resolve disputes on the merits |
| Sufficiency of the complaint to support damages for post‑decree conduct | Plaintiff argued damages evidence (including affidavit) showed post‑decree defamatory conduct causing harm | Defendants argued complaint lacked factual allegations of post‑divorce conduct and any such allegations were not properly pleaded or admitted | Held: Complaint lacked adequate allegations of post‑decree wrongdoing; plaintiff could not rely on affidavit at damages stage to prove liability; judgment cannot stand as pleaded |
| Proper handling of anti‑SLAPP ruling and need for amended pleading | Plaintiff sought to introduce evidence of pre‑ and post‑divorce statements | Defendants contended the judge effectively created a post‑divorce theory without requiring an amended complaint | Held: Court properly considered affidavits on the special motion, but trial judge should have required an amended complaint and clarity on the scope of claims; remanded for further proceedings and consideration of Blanchard implications |
Key Cases Cited
- Burger Chef Sys., Inc. v. Servfast of Brockton, Inc., 393 Mass. 287 (discretionary review of default relief standard)
- Chambers v. RDI Logistics, Inc., 476 Mass. 95 (abuse of discretion standard for trial-judge rulings)
- Coon v. Grenier, 867 F.2d 73 (1st Cir.) (courts should resolve doubts in favor of setting aside defaults under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c))
- Indigo America, Inc. v. Big Impressions, LLC, 597 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.) (factors for assessing good cause to set aside default)
- Jones v. Boykan, 464 Mass. 285 (defaulted party: plaintiff recovers only to extent complaint states valid claim)
- Marshall v. Stratus Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 51 Mass. App. Ct. 667 (for purposes of assessing damages after default, factual allegations of complaint govern liability)
- Flagg v. AliMed, Inc., 466 Mass. 23 (defamation pleading and proof standards)
- Polay v. McMahon, 468 Mass. 379 (intentional infliction of emotional distress elements)
- Conley v. Romeri, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 799 (negligent infliction of emotional distress elements)
- Blanchard v. Carney Hospital, Inc., 477 Mass. 141 (anti‑SLAPP analysis and retroactivity considerations)