Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Chabad Lubavitch of Greater Ft. Lauderdale, Inc.
65 So. 3d 67
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2011Background
- Chabad owned the damaged building; a crane fell during Tropical Storm Barry.
- Chabad had two policies: Lloyd’s all-risk policy with a windstorm exclusion and a separate wind-damage policy.
- Chabad previously recovered limits under the wind policy for the same storm damage.
- Lloyd’s sued for declaratory relief arguing the windstorm exclusion barred the all-risk coverage; Chabad counterclaimed for breach of contract.
- The trial court found the windstorm exclusion ambiguous and construed it against Lloyd’s; on appeal, the issue is whether the exclusion is unambiguous and what the Ensuing Loss provision means.
- The court ultimately held the windstorm exclusion unambiguous, remanding to resolve whether wind was the direct cause of the crane incident.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the windstorm exclusion unambiguous? | Lloyd's contends the exclusion language is clear. | Chabad argues ambiguity in the exclusion. | Unambiguous; exclusion applies. |
| Does the Ensuing Loss provision alter the exclusion's effect? | Lloyd's argues Ensuing Loss aligns with excluding wind. | Chabad contends the provision creates coverage for resulting losses. | Remanded for factual determination on wind as the direct cause. |
| Should the case be remanded to resolve whether wind was the direct cause of the crane damage? | Lloyd's supports remand to determine proximate wind causation. | Chabad advocates for final judgment based on the provision. | Remanded for resolution of the wind-causation issue. |
Key Cases Cited
- Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 845 So.2d 161 (Fla. 2003) (interpretation when multiple meanings exist; read policy as a whole)
- Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So.2d 29 (Fla. 2000) (read each provision with full effect; favor insured on ambiguity)
- Watkins v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., 200 S.E.2d 304 (Ga. App. 1973) (intervening fire after wind as a proximate loss example)
- Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 2001) (standard for de novo review of summary judgment)