Cernosek Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Mont Belvieu
338 S.W.3d 655
| Tex. App. | 2011Background
- Enterprise began drilling within Mont Belvieu to create an underground hydrocarbon storage facility in 2005; it had a Texas Railroad Commission permit but no City of Mont Belvieu permits.
- The City sued Enterprise, and Enterprise moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction to overturn the Railroad Commission permit.
- Following appellate reversal, the parties entered a July 2007 settlement providing for Enterprise to buy certain nearby homes at three times tax value, and to acquire City property, excluding later-moved residents.
- The settlement allowed Enterprise to receive drilling permits for wells previously authorized by the Railroad Commission, while excluding commercial entities and residents who moved after the initial buyout.
- In June 2008, Hill Lumber sued the City and Enterprise alleging violations of municipal ordinances, improper notice, and due-process/inverse-condemnation theories related to the drilling and operation of two wells within 2,500 feet of Hill Lumber’s property; Hill Lumber sought injunctive relief and damages.
- The trial court granted the City’s and Enterprise’s pleas to the jurisdiction and special exceptions, and ultimately dismissed Hill Lumber’s claims with prejudice in July 2009.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the City enjoys governmental immunity from Hill Lumber’s suit. | Hill Lumber argues City acted ultra vires and sought private relief. | City asserts sovereign/governmental immunity and lack of standing. | City’s governmental immunity barred Hill Lumber’s direct suit against the City. |
| Whether Hill Lumber has standing to assert claims against the City and Enterprise. | Hill Lumber claims statutory and common-law standing to challenge permits. | Hill Lumber lacked statutory standing and failed to show a private duty arising from ordinances. | Hill Lumber lacks standing; the trial court’s jurisdictional dismissal was proper. |
| Whether Hill Lumber has a private right of action based on City ordinances to sue Enterprise for tort. | Hill Lumber views ordinances as creating duties giving rise to private tort actions. | Ordinances do not create a private action; Perry factors not satisfied. | Ordinances do not create a private cause of action; Perry factors not satisfied. |
| Whether Hill Lumber’s Perry-based negligence per se theory supports a private action against Enterprise. | Hill Lumber relies on Perry v. S.N. to show statutory duty and damages. | Perry factors do not support extending liability to Hill Lumber; no direct duty to Hill Lumber. | Perry factors not satisfied; no negligence per se action against Enterprise. |
| Whether the trial court erred by granting Enterprise’s special exceptions or by not allowing amendment. | Hill Lumber asserts pleadings were adequate and should be allowed to amend. | Pleadings deficient; jurisdictional issues resolved; no viable amendments. | Court did not err in upholding special exceptions; no remand for amendment. |
Key Cases Cited
- City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) (ultra vires doctrine; official capacity suits vs. city liability)
- Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. 2006) (sovereign immunity and governmental immunity distinctions)
- IT-Davy v. Texas Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, 74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2002) (jurisdictional review and immunity analysis)
- Little-Tex Insulation Co., Inc. v. GAF, 39 S.W.3d 591 (Tex. 2001) (immunities and government liability scope)
- Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. 1997) (sovereign immunity and liability principles)
- City of Dallas v. Blanton, 200 S.W.3d 266 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006) (regarding regulatory takings and due process)