346 Conn. 422
Conn.2023Background
- Plaintiff Mario Cerame (self‑represented) filed a preenforcement challenge seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to permanently enjoin enforcement of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53‑37, which makes it a misdemeanor to "by his advertisement" ridicule or hold a person or class in contempt on account of creed, religion, color, denomination, nationality, or race.
- Cerame alleged he engages in noncommercial, often personal or online, ridicule (including racial/ethnic/religious slurs, republishing comedic material, and criticizing religions) and thus faces a credible threat of prosecution.
- Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction (Article III standing), arguing Cerame failed to allege a credible threat of prosecution because his alleged speech is not covered by § 53‑37.
- The U.S. District Court certified a question to the Connecticut Supreme Court under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51‑199b(d): whether the speech alleged falls within the scope of the phrase "by his advertisement" in § 53‑37.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court analyzed the statutory text, contemporaneous dictionary meanings (1910s), usage in other statutes, and contemporaneous legislative history/newspaper accounts from 1917 showing the law targeted discriminatory posted notices and signage at places of public accommodation.
- Holding: the phrase "by his advertisement" was not intended to reach the personal, noncommercial speech alleged by Cerame; § 53‑37 therefore does not apply to his conduct as pleaded.
Issues
| Issue | Cerame's Argument | Lamont/State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the phrase "by his advertisement" in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53‑37 covers the plaintiff's alleged noncommercial, personal, or online ridicule | § 53‑37 reaches the plaintiff's alleged speech; past enforcement anecdotes suggest broader application | "Advertisement" should be read as commercial/public‑accommodation advertising (signs/paid notices); statute targets commercial notices | The phrase refers to commercial/advertising contexts (as enacted in 1917) and does not cover Cerame's alleged personal/noncommercial speech |
Key Cases Cited
- Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (standing for preenforcement First Amendment challenges requires a credible threat of prosecution)
- Wind Colebrook South, LLC v. Colebrook, 344 Conn. 150 (statutory interpretation is reviewed plenarily and aims to effectuate legislative intent)
- Winakor v. Savalle, 343 Conn. 773 (use of text and related statutes under § 1‑2z)
- Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc., 338 Conn. 687 (use of contemporaneous dictionary definitions when statutes lack definitions)
- State v. Douglas C., 345 Conn. 421 (past prosecutorial practice is not dispositive of legislative intent under § 1‑2z)
- Mahoney v. Lensink, 213 Conn. 548 (judicial notice may be taken of newspaper articles in discerning legislative history)