Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority v. Airport Investment Co.
186 Wash. 2d 336
| Wash. | 2016Background
- Sound Transit condemned portions of Airport Investment Company’s (AIC) property to obtain a permanent guideway easement (PGE) and a temporary construction easement (TCE) for light rail construction; parties disputed just compensation.
- Sound Transit made a written 30-day settlement offer of $463,500 for both easements 30 days before trial; offer stated it could be reevaluated if trial date continued but remained on the table.
- Shortly before trial Sound Transit reduced the TCE footprint (~25% less area) and, on the first day of trial, provided revised TCE language limiting exclusive use to a maximum of 160 nonconsecutive days (still a three-year easement term); Sound Transit withdrew its 30-day offer the first day of trial.
- At trial AIC’s president, Sandra Oh, testified she believed AIC was entitled to $485,000 based on an earlier appraisal; the trial court admitted that testimony as a party admission under ER 801(d)(2).
- Jury awarded AIC $225,000 for the two easements; AIC sought attorneys’ fees under RCW 8.25.070(1)(a) and abandonment fees under RCW 8.25.075(1)(b), and moved for a new trial; trial court denied fees and new trial; Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (AIC) | Defendant's Argument (Sound Transit) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether AIC is entitled to attorney fees under RCW 8.25.070(1)(a) because the 30‑day offer did not match the interest actually taken at trial | The 30‑day offer covered a different TCE than the one actually condemned; because the pretrial offer did not match the interest at trial, AIC had no meaningful offer to accept and thus fees are owed | A timely written 30‑day settlement offer was made; the statute requires “any written offer,” and subsequent narrowing of the TCE did not nullify that offer | Denied—RCW 8.25.070(1)(a) requires a condemnor to make any written offer 30 days before trial; Sound Transit made such an offer, so no fees under (1)(a) |
| Whether fees are available under RCW 8.25.070(1)(b) (judgment exceeds highest 30‑day offer by 10% or more) | Pretrial offer is inapplicable because it did not match the taking; comparison is meaningless when the taking changed | The statutory comparison protects against abusive offers; here AIC did not rely on (1)(b) and record does not show gamesmanship | Denied—(1)(b) inapplicable on facts; no abuse shown |
| Whether the change to the TCE constituted abandonment under RCW 8.25.075(1)(b) | The modification of the TCE (area and duration) was a de facto abandonment of the originally asserted taking and thus triggers abandonment fees | Proceedings went to judgment and property was taken; abandonment requires that condemnor never acquire property | Denied—proceeding not abandoned because property was taken and case litigated to judgment |
| Whether trial court erred by admitting Oh’s testimony about AIC’s earlier $485,000 valuation (nontestifying appraiser) | Oh’s testimony merely conveyed an out‑of‑court expert opinion through a lay witness (conduit for hearsay), violating SentinelC3 precedent | Oh, as company president, adopted the appraisal number as AIC’s belief; admission was a party admission under ER 801(d)(2) and not hearsay | Denied—a party‑opponent admission; Oh manifested adoption of the valuation and testimony was admissible |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Roth, 78 Wn.2d 711 (discussing historical purpose of statutory fee protections in condemnation)
- In re Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 67 Wn.2d 923 (condemnor must present adequate taking description to allow owner to prepare)
- State v. Costich, 152 Wn.2d 463 (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Port of Grays Harbor v. Citifor, Inc., 123 Wn.2d 610 (abandonment requires condemnor never acquired property)
- SentinelC3, Inc. v. Hunt, 181 Wn.2d 127 (limits on introducing an out‑of‑court expert opinion through a party’s testimony)
- State v. DeVincentis, 150 Wn.2d 11 (de novo review of evidentiary rule interpretation; abuse of discretion standard for admissibility)
