CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY v. CRISWELL
1:24-cv-01285
D.D.C.Sep 15, 2025Background
- Congress enacted the Disaster Recovery Reform Act (DRRA) in 2018, directing FEMA to issue a final rule defining “resilient” and “resiliency” by April 5, 2020, for purposes of estimating eligible costs under 42 U.S.C. § 5172(e).
- FEMA never issued a final rule by that deadline; plaintiffs (five environmental nonprofit organizations) sued in May 2024 under the APA § 706(1) to compel issuance of the final rule.
- Plaintiffs contend FEMA’s inaction causes harm to their members through pollution exposure, power outages tied to fossil-fuel infrastructure, and a storm-damaged office that might seek FEMA relief; they seek a directive compelling FEMA to define the terms as they proposed.
- In July 2024 FEMA published a proposed rule defining “resilient” and “resiliency,” but no final rule has issued.
- Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (standing) and argued mootness; the court granted the motion on standing grounds and did not reach mootness.
- The court held plaintiffs failed to show the required causal and redress links between FEMA’s failure to define the terms (a procedural injury) and plaintiffs’ alleged concrete injuries.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing — causation (traceability) | FEMA’s failure to define “resilient” caused continued funding of fossil-fuel infrastructure, which harms members via pollution and outages | Plaintiffs do not plausibly connect the omission to the alleged harms; § 5172(e)(1)(A) only directs cost-estimating, not spending priorities | Court: plaintiffs failed to show a plausible causal link between the omitted rule and their injuries |
| Standing — redressability | A final definition adopting plaintiffs’ preferred terms and priorities would shift FEMA funding to distributed renewables and remedial measures, alleviating harms | Defining the terms would only affect cost estimates; it would not compel or meaningfully constrain FEMA spending | Court: plaintiffs’ redress theory is speculative and insufficient to establish Article III redressability |
| Procedural-right injury scope | The DRRA-created procedural right to a rulemaking is a cognizable injury; plaintiffs rely on relaxed standards for procedural injuries | Even for procedural injuries, plaintiffs must show the omitted procedure would have prevented the concrete harms; plaintiffs fail that second link | Court: first procedural link conceded, second link (connection to concrete injury) not established |
| Mootness (FEMA proposed rule) | Not reached on merits; plaintiffs argued proposed rule insufficient | Defendants argued proposed rule moots claim | Court: declined to reach mootness after dismissal for lack of jurisdiction |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requires injury in fact, causation, and redressability)
- Hawkins v. Haaland, 991 F.3d 216 (procedural-injury plaintiffs must show connection between omitted procedure and concrete injury)
- WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298 (procedural right alone insufficient for Article III standing)
- Narragansett Indian Tribal Historic Preservation Office v. FERC, 949 F.3d 8 (speculative prospects of redress are inadequate for standing)
- Barbosa v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 916 F.3d 1068 (delegation of disaster-relief authority to FEMA under the Stafford Act)