Celia Greengrass v. International Monetary System
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 464
| 7th Cir. | 2015Background
- Celia Greengrass filed an EEOC charge (Jan 20, 2008) alleging sex and national-origin discrimination and retaliation after internal complaints; IMS employees discussed the complaint internally and forwarded her complaint to the alleged harasser.
- IMS initially prepared SEC disclosures that referred generically to former-employee litigants, after consulting an outside accountant; later, after the EEOC indicated it would investigate and conduct interviews, IMS named Greengrass and other former employees by name in its April 6, 2009 Form 10-K and described her claim as “meritless.”
- The EEOC later found reasonable cause to believe Greengrass suffered discrimination and constructive discharge; Greengrass’s EEOC matter resolved by conciliation in late 2009 without reinstatement.
- Greengrass alleges the SEC filings that named her damaged her future employment prospects and filed a second EEOC charge (2010) alleging Title VII retaliation based on IMS’s public disclosures; the EEOC found reasonable cause and issued a right-to-sue letter.
- Greengrass sued IMS for retaliation under Title VII; the district court granted summary judgment for IMS for lack of causation; the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a factual dispute on causation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether naming Greengrass in public SEC filings constitutes an adverse employment action under Title VII | Naming in SEC filings harmed future employment prospects and thus is materially adverse | Naming was a regulatory disclosure, not actionable retaliation | Held adverse: publicly naming a claimant can dissuade employees and impair future employment prospects and thus qualifies as materially adverse |
| Whether Greengrass established causation between EEOC charge and SEC disclosures | IMS named Greengrass in its filing after EEOC ramped up investigation; internal emails show concern and animus — timing, statements, and policy shifts show causation | IMS claims change was driven by advice about SEC Regulation S-K compliance (neutral reason) | Held causation disputed: circumstantial evidence (timing, emails, policy shifts) sufficed to let a jury infer retaliatory motive |
| Whether IMS’s proffered compliance justification is pretextual | IMS previously omitted names after consulting an outside accountant; later inclusion then omission suggests dissembling | IMS relied on auditor/adviser guidance about disclosure obligations | Held plausibly pretextual: inconsistent disclosure practices and lack of evidence about when advice was received permit an inference of pretext |
| Whether there was direct evidence of retaliatory animus | Greengrass points to internal emails and forwarding of complaint to alleged harasser as showing animus | IMS denies discriminatory motive and points to compliance concerns | Held no admission of direct animus, but ambiguous statements and emails are sufficient circumstantial evidence for jury consideration |
Key Cases Cited
- O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625 (7th Cir. 2011) (elements of retaliation claim under the direct method)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (U.S. 2006) (definition of materially adverse action in retaliation context)
- Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2012) (pretext shown by weaknesses and inconsistencies in employer's explanation)
- King v. Preferred Technical Grp., 166 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 1999) (but-for causation standard for retaliation)
- Rudin v. Lincoln Land Community College, 420 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2005) (evidence creating factual dispute defeats summary judgment)
- Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2012) (suspicious timing as circumstantial evidence of causation)
- Magin v. Monsanto Co., 420 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2005) (standard of review for summary judgment)