Cefaratti v. Aranow
141 A.3d 752
Conn.2016Background
- Plaintiff Lisa Cefaratti underwent gastric bypass surgery performed by Dr. Jonathan Aranow at Middlesex Hospital; a sponge was later discovered in her abdomen, and she sued for malpractice.
- Plaintiff alleged Middlesex was vicariously liable because it had held out Aranow as its agent/employee (apparent agency).
- Middlesex moved for summary judgment arguing (1) Connecticut does not recognize apparent agency as a basis for tort liability and (2) Aranow was not its agent. Trial court granted summary judgment on vicarious-liability claim; Appellate Court affirmed.
- The Supreme Court granted certification to decide whether the doctrine of apparent agency applies in tort and whether a hospital can be vicariously liable on that basis.
- The Supreme Court held apparent agency/authority doctrines are available in tort actions, adopted a two-path standard for proving apparent agency in torts, and remanded to permit the plaintiff to attempt to establish the required elements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Connecticut recognizes apparent agency/apparent authority as a basis for vicarious tort liability | Fireman’s Fund and other precedent support application of apparent agency/authority in torts; plaintiff relied on hospital representations | Appellant (Middlesex) argued courts distinguish apparent authority (extends actual agent's authority) from apparent agency (creates agency) and have rejected apparent agency in torts | Court held apparent agency and apparent authority may be applied in tort actions and overruled Appellate Court precedent to the contrary |
| Whether a hospital can be vicariously liable for malpractice of a nonemployee physician under apparent agency | Plaintiff: hospitals that present themselves as providers and select the treating provider may be held vicariously liable without separate proof of detrimental reliance | Middlesex: imposing liability on hospitals for nonemployees is unfair because hospitals lack control over independent physicians | Court held hospitals can be vicariously liable under apparent agency when the doctrine’s elements are met; respondeat superior historically applies to hospitals and apparent agency is available as well |
| What standard/elements govern apparent agency in tort cases | Plaintiff urged adoption of traditional contract-derived elements without explicit detrimental-reliance requirement | Middlesex argued detrimental reliance is required (or the doctrine should be rejected) | Court adopted two alternative paths: (1) plaintiff-show hospital held itself out as provider, plaintiff chose hospital based on that, and plaintiff relied on hospital to select the specific provider; OR (2) traditional apparent-agency elements including actual and reasonable belief plus detrimental reliance that plaintiff would not have accepted the provider otherwise |
| Whether plaintiff met the adopted standard on summary judgment | Plaintiff argued she reasonably believed Aranow was Middlesex’s agent based on seminars, pamphlets, and hospital materials | Middlesex argued plaintiff could not show detrimental reliance and had not proved the adopted elements | Court found unresolved factual issues relevant under new detrimental-reliance formulation and remanded for trial-court proceedings so plaintiff may attempt to prove reliance/detriment under the adopted standards |
Key Cases Cited
- Fireman’s Fund Indem. Co. v. Longshore Beach & Country Club, 127 Conn. 493 (Conn. 1941) (recognized and applied apparent authority principles in a tort context)
- City Bank of New Haven v. Throp, 78 Conn. 211 (Conn. 1905) (explains that agency by estoppel/apparent authority operate on same principle; principal who justifies third-party belief bears the loss)
- Beckenstein v. Potter & Carrier, Inc., 191 Conn. 120 (Conn. 1983) (articulates apparent-authority elements derived from principal’s conduct and third party’s good-faith belief)
- Baptist Memorial Hosp. System v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1998) (holds hospitals may be vicariously liable for independent-contractor physicians under ostensible/apparent agency)
- Grewe v. Mt. Clemens Gen. Hosp., 404 Mich. 240 (Mich. 1978) (apparent agency applies when patient looks to hospital for treatment rather than to a particular physician)