Cedrick Lamar Wilson v. State
504 S.W.3d 337
| Tex. App. | 2016Background
- Cedrick Lamar Wilson was convicted of criminal trespass after returning to the Dayton Community Center on July 8, 2015, following a July 2 written/oral warning given at City Manager David Douglas’s instruction that Wilson was no longer allowed on the property.
- Douglas testified he observed Wilson behaving in ways (staring at and approaching women, sleeping in the lobby, becoming confrontational) that he believed were inconsistent with the center’s purpose and dangerous to patrons; Douglas stated the ban was permanent.
- Officer Boufford delivered the trespass warning on Douglas’s directive and told Wilson to take complaints to the City Manager; Wilson returned six days later and was arrested.
- Wilson argued at trial (and on appeal) that Dayton had no written building-use policy, leaving Douglas with unfettered discretion to ban people; he claimed procedural due process and vagueness violations and that the City Manager lacked authority or guidelines, making his prosecution improper.
- The trial court denied Wilson’s directed-verdict motion; the majority on appeal held Wilson’s complaints were civil remedies and that the Penal Code §30.05 elements were met by proof of an authoritative warning and Wilson’s return.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Wilson) | Defendant's Argument (State/City) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Procedural due process re: unwritten City policy | City’s unwritten policy deprived Wilson of procedural due process because City Manager had unchecked discretion to ban him without notice or process | Wilson’s remedy is civil (lobby City Council or seek injunction); criminal statute requires only notice of forbidden entry, not prior notice of prohibited behaviors | Rejected — civil remedies exist; criminal statute satisfied by warning from authorized person |
| 2. Vagueness of unwritten policy | The unwritten building-use policy is unconstitutionally vague and cannot be enforced against Wilson | The trespass statute does not require notice of specific policy content; Douglas had authority to protect property uses | Rejected — vagueness of City policy is a civil issue and not an element of trespass offense |
| 3. Risk of arbitrary/irrational enforcement | Lack of written guidelines permits arbitrary, discriminatory enforcement by City Manager | Authority to manage city property vests in City Manager; evidence showed Douglas acted to protect public safety | Rejected — no selective-prosecution claim raised; jury could find Douglas had superior right to possession and authority to exclude |
| 4. Sufficiency of evidence for trespass conviction | Evidence insufficient to show Douglas had authority or effectively withdrew consent for July 8 entry | Evidence: Douglas’s role as City Manager, testimony that warning was given by officer at Douglas’s instruction, Wilson’s return on July 8 | Rejected — viewed in light most favorable to verdict, evidence supports each statutory element of §30.05 |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency review under due-process principles)
- Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (government may control use of its property for lawful nondiscriminatory purposes)
- Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (criminal statutes must give ordinary people fair warning)
- Anthony v. State, 209 S.W.3d 296 (Tex. App. — Texarkana) (court found an unwritten municipal ban policy unconstitutionally vague)