Cedric Pierce v. Julio Ruiz
698 F. App'x 843
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- Chicago police arrested Cedric Pierce for DUI after finding his car parked askew; Pierce alleged officers used excessive force during the arrest and then denied medical care for resulting injuries.
- A jury returned a verdict in favor of the arresting officers, Julio Ruiz and Stephen Whitehead; Pierce appealed pro se in part and through counsel in part.
- At trial the district court had issued a pretrial limine ruling limiting testimony about events after arrest; during trial the court permitted narrow testimony that Pierce refused a breathalyzer and that he did not complain of pain before lockup.
- Pierce complained that certain witnesses (described in discovery as known prostitutes) and internal police‑investigation materials were not called or admitted; he also challenged the jury instruction on preponderance of the evidence and portions of defense counsel’s closing argument.
- The district court overruled these objections at trial; on appeal the Seventh Circuit reviewed evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and found Pierce’s challenges waived or without merit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility re: post‑arrest testimony | Trial court misapplied limine and improperly allowed prejudicial testimony about Pierce refusing breathalyzer and appearing uninjured | Testimony was narrowly permitted as responsive and relevant to field sobriety/medical‑care issues per court’s sidebar limits | No abuse of discretion; court properly limited scope and avoided undue prejudice |
| Missing witnesses / evidence | Jury unfair because officers didn’t call identified witnesses and internal investigation materials weren’t admitted | Defendants not obligated to call witnesses; counsel strategy decisions are attributable to Pierce | Waived or meritless; defense not required to call witnesses; strategic decisions imputed to Pierce |
| Jury instruction on preponderance | Instruction’s phrase “consider[] all the evidence” was improper because not all possible evidence was presented | Instruction is routine; refers to evidence introduced at trial; Pierce agreed to it at trial | Waived (no objection) and substantively correct; not plain‑error reviewable |
| Closing argument remark | Defense counsel’s hypothetical about injuries from being lifted was prejudicial | Comment was common‑sense argument contrasting medical evidence; no contemporaneous objection | Waived (no objection) and not shown to be improper or prejudicial |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2001) (appellate courts construe pro se briefs liberally)
- Perry v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 248 (7th Cir. 2013) (evidentiary rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. Grover, 792 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2015) (strategic decisions by counsel are imputed to the client)
- Walker v. Groot, 867 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2017) (failure to object to jury instructions waives appellate review except for plain error)
- Venson v. Altamirano, 749 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2014) (failure to object to closing argument waives the issue on appeal)
- United States v. Clark, 535 F.3d 571 (7th Cir. 2008) (assessing prejudice and propriety of counsel statements in argument)
- Pendell v. City of Peoria, 799 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2015) (claims of ineffective assistance of civil litigation counsel are for separate malpractice actions)
AFFIRMED.
