Cedric Carter v. Betty Mitchell
829 F.3d 455
| 6th Cir. | 2016Background
- In 1992 Cedric Carter participated in a convenience-store robbery in Cincinnati during which he fired two shots; one killed clerk Frances Messinger. Carter confessed at police interview and testified at trial; jury convicted him of aggravated murder and recommended death.
- At sentencing defense called Dr. David Chiappone as a mitigation expert; his testimony included both mitigating family-history material and damaging information (childhood animal cruelty, abuse of women, drug use). Trial counsel did not call Carter’s mother and did not obtain a transcript of the mitigation testimony for the jury despite the jury’s request.
- Post-conviction and appellate proceedings in Ohio denied relief; the Ohio Supreme Court applied Strickland and rejected Carter’s ineffective-assistance claims. U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari twice.
- Carter filed a federal habeas petition raising 50 claims. The Sixth Circuit previously held Carter did not procedurally default Claims 28 and 29 (ineffective assistance at penalty phase and exclusion of mitigation evidence) and remanded to the district court to consider those claims’ merits.
- On remand the district court narrowed the mandate, denied a stay to allow Carter to present additional mitigation evidence in state court (citing Pinholster), and denied habeas relief; Carter appealed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed: it held the district court had erred in narrowing the mandate but did not abuse discretion by denying a stay, and concluded the Ohio courts reasonably applied federal law under AEDPA to reject the preserved ineffective-assistance claims.
Issues
| Issue | Carter's Argument | Warden's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of prior remand | Remand encompassed full Claims 28 and 29 so district court should consider them in full | Remand limited to the specific theories the Sixth Circuit described (mitigation expert prep and mother testimony) | Sixth Circuit: remand was for Claims 28 and 29 in full; district court had erred narrowing it, but relief still unavailable given AEDPA/Pinholster limits |
| Stay-and-abeyance to return to state court to add mitigation evidence | Rhines permits stays to return to state court to introduce additional evidence and exhaust the state record; Wantuck reports are old but were not in state record | Rhines addresses unexhausted claims, not "unexhausted evidence"; Pinholster prevents federal consideration of evidence developed only in federal habeas proceedings; allowing stay would undermine AEDPA finality | Denied: district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing a stay to exhaust additional evidence in state court |
| Ineffective assistance for eliciting damaging mitigation testimony (Dr. Chiappone) | Counsel’s presentation was deficient and prejudicial because expert elicited harmful facts without sufficient mitigation | Trial strategy to present a balanced mitigation picture given prosecution’s possession of damaging records; Ohio courts applied Strickland reasonably | Denied: Ohio courts’ application of Strickland was not unreasonable under AEDPA |
| Ineffective assistance for failing to call Carter’s mother and failing to secure transcript for jury | Mother would have humanized Carter; transcript omission prejudiced sentencing | Mother’s proposed testimony largely paralleled other mitigation evidence; calling her could have been risky; transcript claim waived | Denied: court found mother-omission issue lacked prejudice under Strickland; transcript claim waived for failure to preserve |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Miranda warnings and waiver referenced in confession context)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishes two-prong ineffective-assistance standard)
- Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993) (prejudice inquiry focuses on reliability and fundamental fairness)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (limits on separate fairness inquiry under Strickland)
- Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005) (stay-and-abeyance doctrine for mixed petitions under AEDPA)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (federal habeas review limited to record before state court; bars new evidence developed only in federal habeas)
- Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (2009) (describes "doubly deferential" review of Strickland claims on habeas)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (state-court denials entitled to deference; unreasonable-application standard explained)