Cedar Point Nursery v. Genevieve Shiroma
923 F.3d 524
9th Cir.2019Background
- California enacted the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA) in 1975 and created the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (Board), which promulgated a regulation (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 20900(e)) granting limited access rights to union organizers to meet with agricultural employees on employer premises subject to time, place, and manner limits.
- The regulation allows one labor organization access up to four 30-day periods per year, with organizers limited to one hour before and after work and one hour during lunch, and imposes notice and conduct requirements and sanctions for violations.
- Cedar Point Nursery and Fowler Packing (the Growers) sued the Board seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under § 1983, alleging the regulation as applied to them is (1) a per se Fifth Amendment taking (permanent physical invasion/easement) and (2) an unreasonable Fourth Amendment seizure interfering with possessory rights.
- The district court denied preliminary injunctive relief and dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state plausible Fifth and Fourth Amendment claims; the Growers declined to amend and appealed.
- The Ninth Circuit panel majority affirmed, holding the regulation is not a per se physical taking and does not plausibly allege a Fourth Amendment seizure; a dissent argued the complaint stated a sufficient takings claim under precedent governing nonemployee organizer access.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the access regulation is a per se Fifth Amendment taking (permanent physical invasion) | Regulation creates a permanent easement letting organizers enter without consent or compensation; permanence does not require continuous physical presence | Regulation is limited in scope/time and does not grant a permanent, continuous right to traverse; it affects only the right to exclude (one "strand") not the whole bundle, so not a Loretto-type taking | Not a per se taking; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether the regulation effects a Fourth Amendment seizure (meaningful interference with possessory interests) | Regulation authorizes a technical trespass and substantially interferes with Growers’ right to exclude and changes property character | Mere limited, controlled access is not a meaningful interference; precedents show technical trespass alone is insufficient | No plausible seizure pleaded; dismissal affirmed |
| Ripeness of takings claim | (Plaintiffs asserted ripeness; argued Board enforcement and prior adjudications made claim ripe) | Board did not press ripeness on appeal; court agreed claim was ripe for review | Court treated takings claim as ripe but rejected it on the merits |
| Whether NLRA/Babcock precedent controls analysis | Plaintiffs (and dissent) contend Babcock and its inaccessibility exception apply to limit property exclusion where employees are otherwise inaccessible | Majority: NLRA cases inform ALRA context but do not transform the Fifth Amendment takings analysis; Babcock is not controlling for per se taking question | Babcock relevant to labor-access issues but not dispositive for per se takings or Fourth Amendment seizure analysis in this appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (permanent physical occupation is a per se taking)
- PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (state-imposed limited access to private property did not constitute an unconstitutional taking)
- Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (permanent right to pass to and fro can constitute permanent physical occupation)
- Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (ad hoc balancing for non-per se regulatory takings)
- Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (framework for takings jurisprudence)
- United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (technical trespass does not alone establish a Fourth Amendment seizure)
- United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (seizure occurs when meaningful interference with possessory interests exists)
- Lechmere, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 502 U.S. 527 (limits on nonemployee organizer access; inaccessibility exception is narrow)
- N.L.R.B. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (inaccessibility of employees can require employer accommodation for nonemployee organizers)
- Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (right to exclude is a fundamental property interest)
- Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (distinguishing regulatory obligations from compensable takings)
- Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56 (constitutional framework for seizures)