Ceara v. Deacon
916 F.3d 208
| 2d Cir. | 2019Background
- Rafael Ceara, a pro se incarcerated plaintiff, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming a corrections officer assaulted him on Sept. 5, 2010.
- In his timely original complaint Ceara identified the officer variously as “John Doe” and as “C.O. Deagan” (a misspelling), and included identifying facts (shift, location, that the officer had a brother at the facility, and that the officer was the younger brother).
- The Attorney General’s Office later informed Ceara that Officers John Haag and Joseph Deacon were on duty at the relevant time and place.
- After the statute of limitations expired, Ceara amended to replace “John Doe / C.O. Deagan” with “Officer Joseph Deacon.” Deacon moved for summary judgment arguing the amendment was time-barred.
- The district court granted summary judgment, applying Barrow and treating the original filing as a John Doe complaint that could not relate back under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C).
- The Second Circuit vacated and remanded, holding Ceara’s original pleading was a misnomer/misspelling of the correct defendant (not a true John Doe placeholder) and the amendment related back.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an amendment that substitutes the correct name for a mis‑spelled defendant relates back under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C) so the claim is timely | Ceara: original complaint named the same individual (albeit misspelled) with identifying facts; amendment corrected a misspelling and should relate back | Deacon: the amendment came after the statute of limitations and should be treated as adding a new defendant (a John Doe situation) so no relation back under Barrow | The Second Circuit held the amendment related back: Ceara’s filing was a misnomer, not a John Doe placeholder; Barrow was misapplied and relation back is permitted |
Key Cases Cited
- Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Department, 66 F.3d 466 (2d Cir. 1995) (held that replacing John Doe defendants does not relate back because lack of knowledge of names is not a "mistake of identity")
- Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538 (2010) (clarified that knowledge of a party’s existence does not preclude a mistake of identity for relation‑back analysis)
- Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509 (2d Cir. 2013) (applied Barrow’s framework for Rule 15(c)(1)(C) in § 1983 context)
- Datskow v. Teledyne, Inc., 899 F.2d 1298 (2d Cir. 1990) (relation back allowed where plaintiff mislabelled the correct defendant)
- Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978) (relation back permitted for minor misspelling of defendant’s name)
