Cawley v. State
330 Ga. App. 22
Ga. Ct. App.2014Background
- Cawley was arrested for DUI and speeding on Feb. 19, 2009; accusation filed Mar. 23, 2009; arraigned Apr. 22, 2009 and requested a jury trial.
- Multiple scheduling entries in the court’s Odyssey system: state continuance June 20, 2011 (officer unavailable); trial set for Sept. 12, 2011; Cawley failed to appear that date and appeared Sept. 21, 2011; case later placed on 2013 trial calendar.
- Cawley’s counsel says he never agreed to plead guilty to DUI; an administrative decision reflects an earlier agreement with the arresting officer to plead to reckless driving for license-suspension purposes, but no plea was entered in court.
- Cawley filed a speedy-trial motion on Mar. 1, 2013; trial court denied it in May 2013, the denial was vacated by this court in 2013 for failure to make Barker findings, the trial court entered a more detailed order on Dec. 3, 2013 again denying dismissal, and Cawley appealed interlocutorily.
- The appellate majority found ~58 months elapsed between arrest and the second order denying the motion (presumptively prejudicial), and concluded the trial court wrongly attributed the bulk of delay to Cawley instead of assigning most delay (or neutral delay) to the State.
- Because the trial court misallocated responsibility for delay and thus may have erred in its balancing under Barker/Doggett, the majority vacated and remanded for reconsideration; Judge Andrews dissented, arguing the other Barker factors (late assertion and lack of prejudice) would have constrained the court to deny dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Cawley) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether pretrial delay presumptively prejudices warranting full Barker analysis | 58-month delay from arrest to ruling is presumptively prejudicial | Delay has explanations; no demonstrable prejudice | Majority: Delay (≈58 months) is presumptively prejudicial and triggered Barker analysis |
| Proper allocation of blame for delay (reason for delay factor) | Much of delay was due to State (officer unavailability, docket/retirement, prior appeal); should be weighed against State | Attributed large majority of delay to Cawley (failure to appear, request for nonjury trial) | Majority: Trial court erred in attributing majority of delay to Cawley; most delay was neutral or State-responsible and should be weighed against the State (lightly) |
| Whether Cawley timely asserted his speedy-trial right | Filed motion only after >4 years, so assertion was untimely | Same — Cawley delayed asserting right | Court: Failure to assert for >4 years counts against Cawley; trial court did not abuse discretion weighing this factor against him |
| Prejudice to the defense from delay | Loss of license on second DUI would cause anxiety and possible livelihood harm; presumptive prejudice from length of delay | No oppressive incarceration or shown impairment to defense; little actual prejudice shown | Court: No demonstrable prejudice shown; factor weighed for State, though presumption of prejudice exists from long delay |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (establishes four-factor speedy trial balancing test)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (discusses presumption of prejudice from extreme delay)
- State v. Johnson, 291 Ga. 863 (remand required where trial court misapplies Barker factors; similar facts)
- State v. Pickett, 288 Ga. 674 (trial court has substantial discretion in Barker balancing; error review standard)
- Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52 (delay without explanation is attributable to the State)