140 N.E.3d 837
Ind.2020Background
- Porterfield and a friend left Cavanaugh’s Sports Bar at 3:00 a.m.; a sudden parking‑lot fight broke out and Porterfield was grievously injured and blinded.
- Porterfield sued Cavanaugh’s for negligence, alleging the bar was located in a high‑crime area and had a history of criminal incidents.
- Plaintiff pointed to five police calls to the bar in the prior year responding to fights in the parking area around closing time.
- The trial court denied Cavanaugh’s summary judgment motion; the Court of Appeals held that parking‑lot fistfights at closing time were a foreseeable type of harm and affirmed.
- The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed: it held the bar owed no duty because there was no evidence Cavanaugh’s had present knowledge of circumstances making this particular attack imminent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Cavanaugh’s owed a duty to protect Porterfield from the parking‑lot assault | Porterfield: bars must take precautions where criminal activity is foreseeable; prior police calls show foreseeability | Cavanaugh’s: no duty for unforeseeable third‑party criminal acts absent present knowledge of imminent risk | Court: No duty as a matter of law; attack was unforeseeable without present/specific circumstances indicating imminent harm |
| Whether prior incidents/police runs can establish foreseeability at the duty stage | Prior similar incidents and police responses show the bar should have anticipated fights | Such historical evidence is for proximate‑cause analysis, not the threshold duty inquiry; contemporaneous knowledge is controlling | Court: Historical incidents do not, by themselves, establish duty at the foreseeability (duty) stage |
| Proper scope/standard of foreseeability for duty | Foreseeability is a general, common‑sense inquiry about the broad class of plaintiff and harm | Foreseeability requires evidence the landowner knew or had reason to know of present circumstances making harm probable | Court reaffirmed the two‑part test (broad plaintiff and harm) and emphasized need for present/specific reason to expect imminent harm; contemporaneous knowledge is sufficient but not required; none here |
| Appropriateness of summary judgment | Porterfield: factual disputes preclude summary judgment | Cavanaugh’s: no duty as a matter of law, so summary judgment is appropriate | Court: Summary judgment appropriate for Cavanaugh’s; reversed Court of Appeals and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for defendant |
Key Cases Cited
- Rogers v. Martin, 63 N.E.3d 316 (Ind. 2016) (landowners must take reasonable precautions to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal attacks; foreseeability is a threshold inquiry focusing on broad plaintiff and broad harm)
- Goodwin v. Yeakle's Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 62 N.E.3d 384 (Ind. 2016) (bar not liable for an unexpected shooting; duty‑foreseeability is a lesser, categorical inquiry and should not be premised on the particular facts of the occurrence)
- Hamilton v. Steak ‘n Shake Operations Inc., 92 N.E.3d 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (duty found where restaurant staff observed escalating hostilities between specific groups)
- Certa v. Steak ‘n Shake Operations Inc., 102 N.E.3d 336 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (duty found where staff knew of a verbal altercation and potential for escalation)
- Buddy & Pals III, Inc. v. Falaschetti, 118 N.E.3d 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (duty found where bouncers observed a patron acting dangerously and in a fighting mood)
- Powell v. Stuber, 89 N.E.3d 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (no duty where bar lacked notice of an impending criminal attack in its parking lot)