CAUTHEN v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FIRE & EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, 459 F.Supp.3d 134

Cauthen was appointed a probationary Firefighter/EMT with DCFEMS on September 18, 2017 and reported sexual harassment by two cadets to the EEO liaison and Fire Chief in October 2017.
DCFEMS enforces a strict attendance policy (Bulletin 81): first tardy = official reprimand; repeated tardiness can lead to administrative leave and termination.
Records show Cauthen was counseled for tardiness on Dec. 20, 2017, then marked AWOL on Jan. 3 and Jan. 5, 2018; she signed acknowledgements for those incidents.
DCFEMS terminated Cauthen on January 8, 2018 citing repeated violations of the attendance policy.
Procedurally, Cauthen filed Title VII and DCHRA retaliation claims; counsel changes and a late pro se filing complicated briefing, but counsel ultimately remained and filed the opposition.
The court excluded Cauthen’s later unsworn, self-filed statements from the summary judgment record and treated the District’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts as conceded because Cauthen did not properly contest them.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether termination was unlawful retaliation for reporting sexual harassment	Cauthen says she was fired in retaliation soon after complaining to EEO and the Chief	D.C. says termination resulted from three attendance violations within weeks, per Bulletin 81	Court held D.C. provided a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason and plaintiff failed to show retaliation
Whether plaintiff produced evidence that DCFEMS’s explanation was pretextual	Cauthen points to temporal proximity and affidavits corroborating her harassment reports	D.C. argues temporal proximity alone is insufficient and offered signed acknowledgments and policy showing termination standard	Court held plaintiff failed to produce positive evidence of pretext beyond timing; timing alone insufficient
Admissibility of plaintiff’s unsworn, post-discovery filings ("Amended Judicial Notice")	Cauthen disputes the tardiness findings in those filings	D.C. argues the statements are unsigned/unsworn and not part of the summary judgment record	Court excluded those statements (unsworn, not cited in opposition) and would not consider them for summary judgment
Effect of failing to contest Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts	Cauthen’s opposition did not properly cite record or submit a declaration from herself	D.C. urged the court to treat its facts as undisputed	Court treated D.C.’s facts as conceded and relied on them for summary judgment

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden-shifting framework for employment discrimination/retaliation)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (standards for summary judgment and evidentiary showing)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (genuine-dispute and materiality standards at summary judgment)
Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (focus on pretext once employer offers legitimate reason)
Figueroa v. Pompeo, 923 F.3d 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (factors for assessing employer’s proffered non-retaliatory reason)
Minter v. District of Columbia, 809 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (timing alone insufficient to show pretext)
Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (plaintiff must show both falsity of employer’s reason and discriminatory intent)
Moore v. Hartman, 571 F.3d 62 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (summary judgment not barred when only non-material disputes or divergent inferences exist)