Catron v. City of St. Petersburg
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19746
| 11th Cir. | 2011Background
- Four homeless plaintiffs challenge two St. Petersburg ordinances: Section 20-30 (trespass warnings) and Section 8-321 (storage of personal property).
- Section 20-30 authorizes city agents to issue temporary trespass warnings for specific public property, with various conditions and no formal challenge procedure for warning recipients.
- Section 8-321 prohibits ‘unlawful’ storage of personal property on public property, with notices, removal timelines, and signage provisions.
- Plaintiffs allege enforcement of Section 20-30 deprives them of liberty on city lands and impermissibly burdens intrastate travel under Florida law; they also allege Section 8-321 is vague on its face.
- The district court dismissed all claims; plaintiffs appeal seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirms dismissal in part, vacates in part, and remands on procedural due process aspects of Section 20-30.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Section 20-30 due process adequacy | Catron alleged liberty interest in public parks and sidewalks was curtailed without adequate process. | City argues existing post-deprivation options suffice; warning recipients can be prosecuted under state trespass. | Procedural due process claim as to Section 20-30 pleaded adequately; vacated on that point. |
| Section 20-30 overbreadth | Ordinance grants excessive discretion enabling suppression of speech. | Discretion does not create impermissible broad suppression in every application. | Is not facially overbroad; as-applied challenges required. |
| Intrastate travel right under Florida Constitution | City enforcement policy on sidewalks around parks burdens intrastate travel. | City did not articulate a narrowly tailored government interest. | Policy likely burdens intrastate travel; strict scrutiny not met based on record; remanded/state claim unresolved. |
| Section 8-321 vagueness on public storage | Unclear definitions of 'unlawful storage' and 'unattended' render ordinance vague. | Some conduct clearly proscribed; ordinance generally clear in majority applications. | Not facially vague; as-applied analysis supports Reynolds but Shumate lacks clear proscription; not void for vagueness. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (U.S. 2009) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (pleading must show plausible claim)
- Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (U.S. 1978) (state action necessary for §1983 claims)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1976) (Mathews balancing test for due process)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1972) (due process in probation revocation context)
- Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (U.S. 1997) (pre-deprivation process for government actions)
- Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (U.S. 1992) (overbreadth and discretionary enforcement caution)
- Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (U.S. 2000) (speech restrictions near medical facilities)
- United States v. Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d 625 (11th Cir. 1986) ( vagueness standards and ordinary meaning considerations)