Catholic Ldrship Coaltn of TX v. David Reis
764 F.3d 409
5th Cir.2014Background
- Texas law defines "general-purpose committees" (issue-focused PACs) and requires them to appoint a treasurer and register before making or authorizing political contributions/expenditures beyond low thresholds.
- Texas Election Code § 253.037(a) (as interpreted by the Texas Ethics Commission) imposes three prerequisites before a general-purpose committee may fully operate: appoint a treasurer at least 60 days before exceeding limits; obtain contributions from at least 10 persons; and (via § 253.031(b)) stay under $500 aggregate contributions/expenditures until a treasurer appointment is in effect (the “60‑day, $500 limit”). Violations are criminal misdemeanors.
- Corporations are broadly barred from making contributions to political committees under Tex. Elec. Code § 253.094(a), though post‑Citizens United corporate independent expenditures are permitted and prior decisions allow corporate donations to independent‑expenditure‑only committees.
- Plaintiffs: three Texas general‑purpose committees (TLC‑IPA, Friends of SAFA Texas, Texas Freedom) and a nonprofit (TLC). TLC sought to donate an email contact list (in‑kind) to TLC‑IPA and both challenged the corporate contribution ban as‑applied; plaintiffs also brought facial and as‑applied First Amendment challenges to the treasurer requirement, ten‑contributor rule, and the 60‑day/$500 limit.
- Procedural posture: District court upheld all challenged provisions on cross‑motions for summary judgment; plaintiffs appealed. Fifth Circuit: affirmed some provisions, reversed others, and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Treasurer‑appointment requirement (prior‑registration/prior‑restraint) | Requirement is an unconstitutional prior restraint/impermissible preregistration. | It is a minimal disclosure/organizational requirement tied to enforcement and disclosure interests; burden is minimal. | Requirement is constitutional (treated as disclosure/organizational requirement; minimal burden; substantial relation to disclosure/anticircumvention interests). |
| 60‑day / $500 aggregate limit (temporal monetary cap on contributions & expenditures) | Temporarily caps independent expenditures and aggregate contributions unconstitutionally; facial challenge. | It is a disclosure‑incentive/anticircumvention measure to prevent last‑minute committees from evading disclosure; narrow and manageable. | Facial invalidation: the provision is an unconstitutional limit both as to independent expenditures (strict scrutiny) and as an aggregate contribution cap (Buckley/McCutcheon analysis); not sufficiently tailored. |
| Ten‑contributor requirement (must accept contributions from ≥10 persons before exceeding $500) | Acts as a speech cap and forced association; unconstitutional as contribution/expenditure limit and as an associational burden. | It ensures bona fide committees (not single actors) and furthers disclosure and anticircumvention; only a modest burden. | Facial invalidation: treated as a contribution/expenditure limit (not mere disclosure); fails tailoring and anticorruption/circumvention justifications and is therefore unconstitutional. |
| Corporate contribution ban as‑applied (TLC's donation of an email list to TLC‑IPA) | Ban is unconstitutional as applied because the list would be used only for independent expenditures; comparable to permitting corporate donations to independent‑expenditure‑only committees. | State may ban corporate contributions to hybrid committees that both make contributions and independent expenditures to prevent circumvention/quid pro quo; fungible value (email list) can be abused absent safeguards. | Affirmed as‑applied: State may block the in‑kind corporate donation here because TLC‑IPA is a hybrid committee and plaintiffs failed to show sufficient safeguards (segregation/accounting controls) to assure the list would be used only for independent expenditures; anticircumvention/anticorruption interest is sufficient. |
Key Cases Cited
- Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (establishes different First Amendment tests for expenditure limits, contribution limits, and disclosure/organizational requirements)
- Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (independent expenditures by corporations are protected speech; disclosure is a less restrictive alternative)
- McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014) (aggregate contribution limits invalid where they are not closely drawn to prevent corruption or circumvention)
- SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (disclosure/organizational requirements may be justified by informational and anticorruption interests; independent‑expenditure groups’ limits differ)
- Texans for Free Enterprise v. Texas Ethics Comm’n, 732 F.3d 535 (5th Cir. 2013) (Texas may not bar corporate contributions to independent‑expenditure‑only committees)