Cathie Reisler v. Keith Reisler
2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 11634
| Tex. App. | 2014Background
- Keith filed for divorce in Feb 2010; both parties sought disproportionate property divisions and asserted various claims and counterclaims. A pre‑divorce settlement in Jan 2011 purportedly allocated $1,400,000 equally ($700,000 each) to the parties as separate property, but no pre‑final order confirmed that allocation.
- After a bench trial the trial court signed a memorandum ruling and later a final decree dissolving the marriage and dividing the community estate; it included written findings of fact and conclusions of law.
- Finding of fact no. 18 listed community assets and included both (a) the $1,400,000 pre‑divorce settlement (noted as separate estate) and (b) a Merrill Lynch account in Cathie’s name valued at $554,408.69 as community property.
- Cathie introduced evidence tracing her $700,000 share from the joint account into a Charles Schwab account and then into the Merrill Lynch account, and argued those funds were her separate property under the pre‑divorce settlement.
- The court of appeals concluded the trial court erroneously included Cathie’s Merrill Lynch account as community property in addition to listing the pre‑divorce settlement, creating a materially unjust property division; it reversed the property‑division portion of the decree and remanded for a new division.
- The court also held Cathie failed to preserve her complaint about the valuation methodology used for certain medical investments because she did not timely object to the expert’s methodology at trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Reisler) | Defendant's Argument (Keith) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court made calculation errors producing a disproportionate division of the community estate | The trial court double‑counted Cathie’s $700,000 pre‑divorce allocation by also listing her Merrill Lynch account as community property, resulting in an unjust division | No clear statement of intended percentages in findings; alleged misvaluation is speculative and record does not support re‑calculation on appeal | Trial court erred: inclusion of Merrill Lynch account as community property had no evidentiary support and materially affected division; remanded for new division |
| Whether Cathie was entitled to a disproportionate share of the community estate | She sought a larger share based on trial errors and alleged fault | Opposed; argued trial court’s division was within discretion and percentages are not shown in findings | Court did not reach merits because reversible error in asset listing required remand of entire division |
| Whether trial court properly allocated responsibility for fees to Cathie (issue settled) | N/A (parties settled this issue) | N/A | Not addressed by court because parties settled at oral argument |
| Whether the court erred in valuing community interests in two medical investments using Keith’s expert income‑approach valuations | Schrupp’s income‑approach valuations were unreliable with computational errors and wrong industry premium (used 2011 SBBI vs 2012) | Issue forfeited: no timely objection at trial to the expert’s methodology, and expert gave a factual basis for her opinions | Not preserved for appeal; issue waived because no timely objection to methodology was made at trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Moroch v. Collins, 174 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005) (abuse‑of‑discretion standard for property division)
- Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1998) (deference to trial court in family law asset division)
- Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1981) (trial court’s broad discretion in dividing community property)
- In re Marriage of C.A.S. and D.P.S., 405 S.W.3d 373 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013) (interaction of abuse‑of‑discretion and sufficiency review in family law)
- Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. 1985) (reversible error in part of property division requires remand of entire community estate)
- City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2009) (expert testimony admitted without objection may be considered even if methodology is unreliable; exception when no basis is provided)
- Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. 2004) (need to object to expert methodology to preserve complaint)
- Guadalupe‑Blanco River Auth. v. Kraft, 77 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. 2002) (timely objection required to preserve complaint about expert testimony)
- Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. 1998) (same preservation principle)