Catherine Regina Harper v. Professional Probation Services Inc., 976 F.3d 1236

Background

Gardendale, AL contracted with Professional Probation Services (PPS) to supervise misdemeanor probationers who could not immediately pay fines; PPS was paid by probationers and kept a $40 monthly supervisory fee.
Judges signed an “Order of Probation” and provided a pre-signed, blank “Sentence of Probation” form that PPS filled out.
Plaintiffs allege PPS unilaterally extended probation terms (e.g., 12 → 24 months), increased fines, and added conditions (e.g., abstinence and testing) without independent judicial review, and that violations of PPS-imposed terms could lead to jail.
PPS’s $40 fee created a direct financial incentive to prolong probation because it was paid only while probation remained open.
Plaintiffs (Harper, Essig, Jones) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Fourteenth Amendment due process violations (lack of impartiality by a quasi-judicial actor); the district court dismissed; the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether PPS acted as a state actor performing a judicial function	PPS exercised delegated judicial power by imposing binding sentence enhancements; thus it acted under color of state law	PPS argued it did not perform judicial functions because municipal judges pre-signed forms and retained ultimate authority	Held: PPS performed a judicial function (imposing binding sentence terms) and thus was a state actor in a quasi-judicial capacity
Whether the judicial-impartiality (neutrality) requirement applies to PPS	Judicial impartiality applies to anyone performing adjudicative functions, so PPS is subject to the rule	PPS contended it was not a judge and pre-authorization by judges meant its actions were not judicial	Held: The neutrality requirement applies to quasi-judicial actors; pre-authorization does not negate PPS’s judicial function
Whether PPS’s financial incentive violated the Due Process Clause	PPS’s $40/month revenue created a substantial pecuniary interest that tempted bias, violating due process	PPS implied its practices were authorized by the court’s forms and thus non-actionable	Held: PPS’s direct pecuniary interest in prolonging probation violated the strict impartiality requirement of the Due Process Clause
Whether plaintiffs adequately alleged a §1983 theory against the corporate entity (policy or custom)	Plaintiffs alleged a pattern and practice by PPS (typical extensions, general additions of conditions) sufficient at motion-to-dismiss stage under Monell	PPS argued corporate liability requires more specific proof than the complaint alleged	Held: At the motion-to-dismiss stage, plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to plausibly show PPS’s policy or custom caused the violations; claim survives dismissal

Key Cases Cited

Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (Due Process prohibits adjudication by a judge with a direct pecuniary interest in convictions)
Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (Due Process forbids adjudication where governmental financial interest creates temptation to convict)
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (less direct financial interests can nonetheless violate due process)
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (impartiality requirement extends to quasi-judicial actors)
Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602 (delegated adjudicative functions by private parties can constitute state action)
United States v. Heath, 419 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2005) (probation officers perform judicial functions when setting binding probation terms)
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (municipal or corporate §1983 liability requires an unconstitutional policy or custom)
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (a pattern of similar constitutional violations can establish a policy or custom)