Catawba County ex rel. Rackley v. Loggins, 152PA16

In 1999 the District Court entered a Voluntary Support Agreement (VSA) ordering Jason Loggins to pay $0 monthly support and reimburse the State; a later 2001 "Modified VSA" (entered by the court) set monthly child support at $419 and became the operative order at issue.
Loggins repeatedly failed to pay; the court entered various consent contempt orders and later adjusted payments and arrears in subsequent proceedings (including 2007 and 2011 actions).
In 2011 the court reduced Loggins’s obligation based on changed circumstances after a pro se motion by Loggins; arrears were recalculated.
In 2014 Loggins moved under Rule 60 to void the 2001 VSA, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to approve it because no motion to modify the 1999 order had been filed by Rackley (plaintiff) showing changed circumstances.
The district court granted Rule 60 relief, declaring the 2001 VSA void for lack of a precipitating motion; the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the court retained jurisdiction and the motion requirement in N.C.G.S. § 50‑13.7(a) is not a jurisdictional prerequisite in this context.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether district court loses jurisdiction to modify a child support order when no party files a motion in the cause showing changed circumstances under N.C.G.S. § 50‑13.7(a)	Rackley: court retained continuing jurisdiction; failure to file a motion did not divest jurisdiction and the VSA satisfied the statute’s purposes	Loggins: § 50‑13.7(a) requires a motion and changed‑circumstances showing before modification; absent that the court had no authority and the 2001 VSA is void	Court held the district court retained continuing jurisdiction; the motion requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite and is directory; the 2001 VSA was not void on that ground

Stanback v. Stanback, 287 N.C. 448 (N.C. 1975) (judicial decree in custody/support matters is subject to alteration on change of circumstances; court retains continuing jurisdiction while minor child remains within jurisdiction)
In re D.S., 364 N.C. 184 (N.C. 2010) (statutory timing provision that does not mention jurisdiction should not be construed to divest court of subject‑matter jurisdiction)
In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588 (N.C. 2006) (distinguishes truly jurisdictional statutory requirements from directory procedural requirements; some statutory mandates may render a judgment void)
Barnwell v. Barnwell, 241 N.C. 565 (N.C. 1955) (statutory notice provision held jurisdictional in alimony context where statute required notice and failure rendered order void)
Royall v. Sawyer, 120 N.C. App. 880 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (noting a court may not sua sponte modify a support order; modification typically requires a motion)