CASTRO-TUM, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271

Background

The Attorney General reviewed Board decision in Matter of Castro-Tum (certified Jan 4, 2018) concerning an IJ’s administrative closure of removal proceedings for a Guatemalan respondent who repeatedly failed to appear.
The IJ administratively closed the case (and others) over DHS’s objection, citing concerns about adequacy/reliability of HHS-ORR addresses; the Board vacated and remanded directing recalendaring and in‑absentia proceedings if the respondent again failed to appear.
EOIR statistics show explosive growth in administrative closures: hundreds of thousands of cases removed from active dockets, with few recalendared.
Regulations and past practice authorized administrative closure only in narrow, specific circumstances (e.g., LIFE Act, T/V nonimmigrant rules, settlement agreements), and some EOIR policy memos encouraged the tool.
The Attorney General concluded immigration judges and the Board lack a general authority to suspend proceedings indefinitely by administrative closure; only express regulatory or settlement authorization permits it. Existing closed cases must be recalendared on motion of either party (subject to phased administration).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether IJs/Board have general authority to administratively close cases indefinitely	IJs/Board have implied authority under general regulatory powers to take actions "appropriate and necessary" and to "regulate the course of the hearing"	No statute or regulation delegates general authority; existing regulations permit only specific administrative closure or continuances; DHS must control initiation/prosecution	Held: No general authority. Administrative closure only where explicitly authorized by regulation or settlement.
Whether regulations (8 C.F.R. §§1003.10,1003.1,1240.1,1003.9) confer closure power	These provisions grant broad discretion to resolve cases and manage hearings/dockets	These provisions require timely resolution and list limited powers; construing them to allow indefinite suspension would render specific delegations superfluous	Held: Those regulations do not authorize indefinite administrative closure; continuance/docketing rules suffice for temporary pauses.
Whether IJs/Board possess inherent adjudicatory power like Article III courts to administratively close cases	Past reliance and analogy to federal courts’ docket management imply inherent power	IJs/Board act by delegation of the Attorney General and lack Article III inherent powers; federal‑court analogies inapposite	Held: No inherent authority; any power must be delegated by AG/statute/regulation.
Remedy for existing administratively closed cases entered without authority	Keep closures in place unless challenged; Board standards already limit recalendaring	Recalendar all unauthorized closures immediately	Held: Allow current closures to remain until a party moves to recalendar; upon motion IJ or Board must recalendar; closures authorized by specific regs/settlements remain effective.

Key Cases Cited

INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314 (1992) (delays tend to advantage removable aliens)
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (agency may choose adjudication over rulemaking)
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) (agency discretion in procedure choice)
Continental Cas. Co. v. United States, 314 U.S. 527 (1942) (express delegation implies denial of undescribed powers)
Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282 (1929) (mode specified implies exclusion of other modes)
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (Article III courts’ inherent powers)
Abudu v. INS, 485 U.S. 94 (1988) (public interest in prompt resolution of immigration proceedings)
Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386 (1995) (delay undermines enforcement interests)
Diaz-Covarrubias v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2009) (no statutory or regulatory basis for administrative closure)
Gonzalez-Caraveo v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2018) (describing Board practice but not resolving delegation question)