Castillo v. United States, 75 A.3d 157

Defendant Castillo was convicted of misdemeanor sexual abuse for allegedly touching his 14‑year‑old stepdaughter E.M.’s breast on Dec. 25, 2010; conviction rested solely on three out‑of‑court statements admitted as excited utterances.
Police responded after a 2:00 a.m. 911 call by Francisco Martinez reporting he had witnessed “something inappropriate.” Officers Durham and Gonzalez later encountered E.M. crying and hysterical; Martinez also reported observing the touching.
At trial both E.M. and Martinez testified they recalled little of the incident and had been intoxicated.
The government admitted: (1) E.M.’s statement to Officer Durham; (2) E.M.’s statement to Officer Gonzalez; and (3) Martinez’s statement to Officer Gonzalez — each offered under the spontaneous/excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.
Trial court credited officer testimony about declarants’ emotional states and admitted the three statements; used those statements to convict Castillo.
The D.C. Court of Appeals reversed, holding the record lacks sufficient evidence of the requisite temporal nexus and spontaneity, and the error was not harmless because the conviction rested entirely on the admitted hearsay.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Government)	Defendant's Argument (Castillo)	Held
Admissibility of E.M.’s and Martinez’s out‑of‑court statements as excited utterances	Statements were spontaneous: declarants were hysterical/upset when officers arrived and spoke within minutes of the dispatch, so no time for reflection	Government failed to prove the statements were made within a reasonably short time after the event or that declarants lacked opportunity to reflect; emotional descriptors alone are insufficient	Reversed: trial court abused its discretion; record does not establish temporal nexus or spontaneity required for excited utterance admission
Harmless‑error analysis	Even if erroneous, the statements were reliable and did not affect outcome	Erroneous admission was outcome‑determinative because conviction depended entirely on the three hearsay statements	Not harmless: government could not show it was highly probable the error did not contribute to the verdict

Brown v. United States, 27 A.3d 127 (D.C. 2011) (sets excited utterance elements and emphasizes timing and spontaneity)
Odemns v. United States, 901 A.2d 770 (D.C. 2006) (requires temporal proximity to preclude reflection; adjectives describing upset alone are insufficient)
In re L.L., 974 A.2d 859 (D.C. 2009) (declarant’s reliving/reflecting can defeat spontaneity)
Williams v. United States, 859 A.2d 130 (D.C. 2004) (child’s statement hours after abuse may be admissible depending on age and circumstances)
Lewis v. United States, 938 A.2d 771 (D.C. 2007) (seriousness of event and circumstantial evidence can support inference of short interval)
Smith v. United States, 666 A.2d 1216 (D.C. 1995) (distraught and shocked declarant can satisfy nervous‑excitement element)
In re J.D.C., 594 A.2d 70 (D.C. 1991) (trial court abuses discretion where stated reasons lack sufficient factual predicate)