722 F.3d 1281
11th Cir.2013Background
- Castillo was tried in Florida for three counts of attempted armed robbery; a six‑person jury convicted her after a three‑day trial and she was sentenced as a habitual offender.
- Dispute centers on whether juror Ingrid Caldwell missed all testimony on day two and then either (a) was replaced by an alternate and did not deliberate, or (b) returned and participated in deliberations and the verdict.
- Castillo’s trial counsel did not object to Caldwell’s participation; Castillo raised ineffective-assistance claims in state collateral proceedings and federal habeas court.
- The district court granted habeas relief, finding counsel deficient and concluding prejudice was presumed under Cronic (and relying on Harding), so Strickland’s actual‑prejudice requirement was excused.
- The Eleventh Circuit majority assumed facts most favorable to Castillo (that Caldwell missed day two and did deliberate) but reversed: counsel’s failure to object did not meet Cronic’s narrow exceptions and Castillo failed to show Strickland prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel’s failure to object to a juror who missed day‑two testimony but deliberated is per se prejudicial (Cronic) | Castillo: counsel’s failure presumed prejudicial under Cronic (and Harding); no need to show Strickland actual prejudice | State: Cronic inapplicable; Strickland governs and actual prejudice must be shown | Cronic does not apply; counsel did not entirely fail and did not deny assistance; must satisfy Strickland’s prejudice requirement |
| Whether counsel entirely failed to test the prosecution’s case (second Cronic exception) | Castillo: a single critical omission (failure to object) amounted to total failure | State: counsel consistently and actively defended (motions, cross‑examination, closing) | Counsel actively and meaningfully opposed prosecution; second Cronic exception inapplicable |
| Whether Roe v. Flores‑Ortega supports presumption of prejudice | Castillo: analogized loss of a constitutionally adequate jury to loss of appellate proceeding, arguing forfeiture of an essential stage warrants presumption | State: Roe is limited to counsel’s failure to pursue an appeal and does not extend to trial errors requiring Strickland | Roe is inapposite; losing an appeal is different from an objection omission during trial; Strickland applies |
| Whether Castillo showed actual prejudice under Strickland | Castillo: argues structural or presumed prejudice; does not show reasonable probability of different outcome | State: overwhelming inculpatory evidence across all three days; no reasonable probability of different verdict | No actual prejudice shown; evidence was highly incriminating and verdict would not likely differ |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (U.S. 1984) (identifies three narrow circumstances where prejudice may be presumed)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two‑part ineffective assistance test: deficient performance and actual prejudice)
- Cone v. Bell, 535 U.S. 685 (U.S. 2002) (Cronic’s exceptions are narrow; complete failure of counsel required to presume prejudice)
- Harding v. Davis, 878 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir. 1989) (counsel’s near‑total silence resulted in presumed prejudice on facts of that case)
- Roe v. Flores‑Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (U.S. 2000) (counsel’s failure to file an appeal may warrant a modified Strickland prejudice analysis in unusual forfeiture contexts)
- Purvis v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 734 (11th Cir. 2006) (Strickland prejudice required even where structural or constitutional trial errors alleged)