27 I. & N. Dec. 664
BIA2019Background
- Respondent Castillo‑Perez, a Mexican national present in the U.S. since 1997, applied for cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(b), which requires 10 years continuous presence and that the applicant be a person of good moral character during that period.
- Castillo‑Perez has multiple alcohol-related offenses: DUI convictions in 2010 and 2012, prior negligent driving and public‑drunkenness charges, and earlier domestic‑assault arrests; he admits alcohol was a major factor.
- After his last DUI he entered an alcohol‑safety program, stopped drinking, and attends Alcoholics Anonymous; the immigration judge found these rehabilitation efforts sufficient and granted cancellation of removal in 2016.
- The Board of Immigration Appeals vacated that grant, concluding Castillo‑Perez failed to show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship and, alternatively, lacked good moral character; it ordered removal.
- The Attorney General reviewed the case and affirmed the Board, holding that two or more DUI convictions during the relevant period give rise to a rebuttable presumption that an alien lacked good moral character and is presumptively ineligible for cancellation of removal.
Issues
| Issue | Castillo‑Perez (Plaintiff) | DHS (Defendant) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether multiple DUI convictions during the statutory period establish that an alien lacks good moral character under INA § 101(f) | Multiple DUIs do not conclusively show lack of good moral character; rehabilitation and positive equities can offset | Multiple DUIs are strong evidence of misconduct relevant to good moral character and should bar relief absent rebuttal | Two or more DUI convictions during the relevant 10‑year period create a rebuttable presumption the alien lacked good moral character |
| Whether post‑conviction rehabilitation alone can overcome that presumption | Rehabilitation demonstrates reformation and should justify a favorable exercise of discretion | Rehabilitation after the convictions does not prove the required good moral character during the statutory 10‑year period | Rehabilitation after offenses, by itself, does not overcome the presumption because good moral character must exist during the statutory period that includes the convictions |
| Whether multiple DUIs should presumptively preclude discretionary cancellation given annual numerical limits | Granting relief should consider full equities; numerical limits are not dispositive | Given the 4,000 annual cap and public‑safety harms, multiple DUIs weigh heavily against granting scarce relief | Multiple DUIs are a significant negative equity; given limited slots, such convictions presumptively foreclose cancellation unless rebutted |
Key Cases Cited
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (recognition of Attorney General discretion in denying relief)
- Carachuri‑Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (discretionary relief and statutory interpretation principles)
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (nationwide criminalization and public‑safety rationale for DUI rules)
- Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (context on national efforts addressing drunk driving)
- Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (criminal conduct is probative of character)
- United States v. Francioso, 164 F.2d 163 (good moral character tied to community moral conventions)
- Ledezma‑Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042 (DUI and habitual drunkard analysis)