Castillo, Ex Parte Thomas Edward, PD-0545-14

Background

Castillo faced two prosecutions arising from the same incident: a capital-murder trial (victim named Roy Nava; burglary + aggravated assault as predicate) and a later aggravated-assault indictment naming Carol Sanchez as the victim.
In the capital-murder trial the jury charge authorized conviction if the defendant entered a habitation and committed “aggravated assault” against “another”; the indictment/charge did not identify explicitly which assault victim (Nava or Sanchez).
The defense moved to set aside/quash the capital indictment for lack of particularity and to consolidate the two indictments; the State opposed both motions and the trial court denied them.
The State introduced extensive evidence and argument about Sanchez’s injuries in the capital-murder trial and emphasized Sanchez in closing—despite Castillo’s objections that this evidence was extraneous misconduct.
Castillo was acquitted of capital murder; the State later sought to prosecute him for aggravated assault against Sanchez. Castillo argued that double jeopardy bars the subsequent prosecution because the offenses are legally and factually the same.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Castillo)	Held
Whether aggravated-assault prosecution is barred by double jeopardy after acquittal for capital murder	Two offenses allege different units of prosecution (Nava vs. Sanchez); capital-murder conviction required assault against Nava, not Sanchez	Indictment, charge, evidence, and prosecutor argument left victim identity ambiguous; jury could have relied on Sanchez as the assault victim, so the offenses are the same	Court originally held offenses were not factually the same (disagreed by Castillo in rehearing motion)
Whether capital-murder indictment was sufficiently particular to prevent later prosecution for related offense	Indictment naming the deceased as victim was adequate for capital murder	Indictment was vague about which person was the assault victim; article 21.04 required particularity to bar subsequent prosecutions	Castillo argues the indictment’s vagueness permitted multiple interpretations and should bar a later assault prosecution
Whether State’s trial choices (refusing consolidation, introducing Sanchez evidence, arguing Sanchez as victim) preclude it from avoiding double jeopardy	State relied on trial rulings and its theory that the aggravated assault predicate pertained to Nava	State’s strategic choices created ambiguity; it should not be allowed to benefit from that ambiguity by prosecuting later	Castillo contends the State cannot profit from the lack of specificity it created
Application of lesser-included / Nielsen tests to bar subsequent prosecution	State treated offenses as distinct units	Aggravated assault is a lesser-included of burglary, burglary is a lesser-included of capital murder; by transitivity assault is a lesser-included of capital murder; Nielsen same-incident test also bars prosecution	Castillo urges rehearing because both lesser-included and Nielsen standards bar the second prosecution

Key Cases Cited

Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977) (double jeopardy: greater offense bars later prosecution for lesser included offense)
King v. State, 594 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (capital indictment must be particular when it could be read to allege assault on someone other than the named deceased)
Ex parte Chaddock, 369 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (prior prosecution for greater offense bars later prosecution for lesser-included predicate)
Ex parte Goodbread, 967 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (if evidence supports conviction for multiple offenses and no election is made, prior conviction or acquittal may bar later prosecution)
Ex parte Pruitt, 233 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (same principle regarding uncertainty about which offense the conviction or acquittal encompassed)
Garfias v. State, 424 S.W.3d 54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (appellate review of double-jeopardy claims may rely on the trial record)
State v. Meru, 414 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (indictment particularity and remedy: quash and refile to allow lesser-included instruction)
Littrell v. State, 271 S.W.3d 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (transitive relation of lesser-included offenses)
Moore v. State, 969 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (lesser-included relationships carry through chains of offenses)
Pinkerton v. State, 660 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (capital indictment not erroneous when unambiguous that predicate victim is the deceased)
Silguero v. State, 608 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (indictment construction principles)
Stephens v. State, 806 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (recognition of Nielsen’s same-incident test)
Terry v. State, 471 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (indictment sufficiency principles)