Castaneda Castillo v. Holder, Jr.
723 F.3d 48
| 1st Cir. | 2013Background
- Castañeda petitions for EAJA fees after a twenty-year immigration saga culminating in asylum grant in 2012.
- This court previously retained jurisdiction after remands in Castañeda II and IV and issued final judgments in Castañeda V.
- Extradition and habeas proceedings occurred in district court during the immigration litigation.
- EAJA petition asserts fees for four decisions (I, II, IV, V) and related post-remand administrative and district-court proceedings.
- The court ultimately decouples fee eligibility: fees for later post-remand/admin proceedings and Castañeda IV–V are potentially recoverable, while earlier I–II fees are not for timeliness reasons.
- The court also addresses enhanced rates, cost-of-living adjustments, and propriety of costs and time records.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Castañeda is a prevailing party for EAJA purposes | Castañeda merits prevailing-party status for IV and V (and related stages). | Government contends no prevailing-party status for IV–V due to remand mechanics and final judgments. | Castañeda is a prevailing party for IV and V proceedings. |
| Timeliness of the EAJA petition for fees related to IV–V | Petition timely from July 2012 (final judgment expired July 11, 2012). | Timeliness would require earlier filing after IV and IV judgment finalization; separate actions arguable. | Petition timely for IV–V proceedings. |
| Whether costs and post-remand administrative fees are recoverable under Hudson and related authorities | Post-remand admin proceedings are 'intimately related' to civil action and recoverable. | Fees for habeas/extradition and non-agency proceedings not recoverable; agency fees arguable under Hudson only if intimately related. | Recoverable fees include post-remand admin proceedings; habeas/extradition fees denied. |
| Whether the government's positions in IV–V were substantially justified | Government missteps and weak justification supported fee recovery. | Positions were substantially justified; argued procedural grounds. | Government's positions were not substantially justified; fee award granted. |
| Whether Castañeda I–II fees are recoverable under EAJA when timeliness barred | Jean-like inclusive treatment should allow recovery for I–II. | Two separate actions with separate limitations; I–II fees untimely. | I–II fees denied; not timely under EAJA; remedies limited to IV–V. |
Key Cases Cited
- Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (Supreme Court, 2001) (prevailing party requires a judgment on the merits or consent decree)
- Ardestani v. I.N.S., 502 U.S. 129 (Supreme Court, 1991) (strict construction of EAJA against government)
- Jean v. United States, 496 U.S. 154 (Supreme Court, 1990) (EAJA fee eligibility favors inclusive treatment of petitions)
- Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 1991) (final judgment under EAJA is a court-of-law judgment)
- Schaefer v. Sullivan, 509 U.S. 292 (Supreme Court, 1993) (remand timing and final judgment in SSA context)
- Former Employees of Motorola Ceramic Products v. United States, 336 F.3d 1360 (Federal Circuit, 2003) (remand with retained jurisdiction can create prevailing party status)
- Johnson v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2005) (immigration remands to BIA analyzed for EAJA timing)
- Gómez-Beléno v. Holder, 644 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2011) (EAJA timing for multiple petitions)
- Rueda-Menicucci v. I.N.S., 132 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 1997) (immigration remands and EAJA timing considerations)
- Muhur v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 2004) (remand with agency proceedings in immigration context)