Cassidy Lynne Aragon v. Reynaldo Manuel Aragon
2017 Tenn. LEXIS 159
| Tenn. | 2017Background
- Parents divorced in 2010; incorporated parenting plan provided roughly equal parenting time but, after mother worked overseas, father became the parent spending substantially more residential time with the child.
- Father accepted a nursing position in Tucson, Arizona, and gave statutory notice under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108; mother opposed the relocation and filed to block it.
- Trial court found Father’s stated purpose not "reasonable," designated mother primary residential parent, and limited father’s parenting time; father appealed.
- Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision that adopted an interpretation requiring a "significant" or "substantial" purpose; the dissent said that interpretation was incorrect.
- The Tennessee Supreme Court granted review to determine the proper construction of "reasonable purpose," allocation of burdens under § 36-6-108(d)(1), and whether mother met her burden to deny relocation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Aragon) | Defendant's Argument (Aragon) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of "reasonable purpose" under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(d)(1)(A) | "Reasonable" should be construed narrowly so the court can block moves lacking substantial justification | "Reasonable" carries its ordinary meaning; Webster’s “significant/substantial” gloss is incorrect | Overruled Webster; "reasonable purpose" given ordinary, natural meaning (not a heightened "substantial" standard) |
| Allocation of burden of proof on relocation where one parent spends more time with the child | Mother bore burden to prove one of the statutory grounds to deny relocation | Father argued the trial court shifted the burden onto him improperly | Affirmed statutory allocation: parent opposing relocation (mother) bears burden to prove a ground to deny relocation |
| Whether Father’s move to Tucson had a "reasonable purpose" | Mother argued the move breached prior understanding and was not reasonable (and emphasized father did not search for Tennessee jobs) | Father relied on job offer, greater income opportunity, and extensive family support in Tucson | Mother failed to prove lack of reasonable purpose; Father stated a reasonable purpose and was entitled to relocate under § 36-6-108(d)(1) |
| Remedy given geographic/time passage during appeals | Mother maintained post-trial status quo as primary residential parent while appeals pending | Father sought immediate approval to relocate and designation as primary residential parent | Supreme Court reversed denial and parenting-plan modification; remanded allowing trial court to craft a transitional parenting plan to effectuate father’s relocation within a reasonable time |
Key Cases Cited
- Seessel v. Seessel, 748 S.W.2d 422 (Tenn. 1988) (custodial parent bears burden to show relocation is in child's best interest absent statute)
- Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319 (Tenn. 1993) (listed multiple factors courts considered in relocation disputes)
- Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623 (Tenn. 1996) (adopted a restrictive standard limiting interference with custodial parent's relocation except for vindictive motive or specific, serious harm)
- Kawatra v. Kawatra, 182 S.W.3d 800 (Tenn. 2005) (addressed measurement of parental time for relocation analysis)