Cassandra Morrow v. Kroger Limited Partners
681 F. App'x 377
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Plaintiffs Cassandra Morrow and Savannah Barron, Kroger employees, alleged sexual harassment by meat market manager Mickey Mancini (comments, groping, after-hours texts/calls).
- Plaintiffs filed internal complaints in August 2012; Kroger investigated, suspended Mancini 11 days, issued a formal write-up, and offered plaintiffs transfer options; plaintiffs later left the meat department (one transferred, one resigned).
- Morrow sued Kroger and Mancini (Title VII claims against Kroger; tortious interference against Mancini); Barron filed a similar suit; the cases were consolidated.
- The district court granted Kroger’s motion for summary judgment (finding Mancini was not a Title VII "supervisor") and dismissed plaintiffs’ tortious interference claims against Mancini under Rule 12(b)(6) as preempted by the LMRA.
- Plaintiffs appealed; the Fifth Circuit reviewed both summary judgment and Rule 12(b)(6) de novo and affirmed the district court’s rulings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mancini was a Title VII "supervisor" whose actions make Kroger vicariously liable | Mancini exercised supervisory functions (evaluations, scheduling, influence over hiring) and thus was a supervisor | Kroger: Mancini lacked authority to take tangible employment actions (hire/fire/reassign); those powers rested with store manager and others | Mancini was not a Title VII supervisor; no genuine dispute of material fact on that element; summary judgment for Kroger affirmed |
| Whether Kroger failed to prove the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense (reasonable reporting delay) | Plaintiffs contend Kroger didn’t show they unreasonably delayed reporting, so employer defense fails | Kroger argued employer had defenses under Faragher/Ellerth | Court did not reach this issue because Mancini was not a supervisor; defense unnecessary |
| Whether plaintiffs’ tortious-interference claims against Mancini are preempted by §301 of the LMRA | Plaintiffs argued state-law tort claim viable against individual manager | Defendants argued resolution requires interpreting the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) governing plaintiffs’ employment, so claim is preempted | Tortious-interference claims are preempted because proving them would require analysis/interpretation of the CBA; dismissal affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013) (defines Title VII "supervisor" as one empowered to take tangible employment actions)
- Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (state-law claims requiring interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements are preempted by §301)
- Thomas v. LTV Corp., 39 F.3d 611 (5th Cir. 1994) (application of state law requiring interpretation of CBA is §301 preemption)
- Matherne v. Ruba Mgmt., [citation="624 F. App'x 835"] (5th Cir. 2015) (employee with some leadership duties not a Title VII supervisor)
- Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co., [citation="576 F. App'x 442"] (5th Cir. 2014) (foreman with indirect influence not a Title VII supervisor)