Cassandra L. Mceuen v. State, 2017 WY 15

On Aug. 21, 2015, Officer Josh Buhmann activated lights/horn to stop an ATV driven by Cassandra McEuen for lack of registration; McEuen initially did not stop and later acted evasively and walked toward an apartment building.
During the encounter, Buhmann grabbed McEuen’s arm to prevent her entering the building; McEuen kicked him multiple times while resisting and attempted to walk away, later struggled while being escorted and was pinned and handcuffed.
A jury convicted McEuen of felony interference with a peace officer (intentional/knowing attempt to cause bodily injury to an officer engaged in lawful performance) and vehicle registration/insurance offenses.
On appeal McEuen challenged only the felony interference conviction, arguing (1) the officer was not lawfully performing duties/excessive force negated liability, (2) insufficient evidence of specific intent to injure, (3) trial court refused her self-defense jury instructions, and (4) court failed to define “lawful performance” and “attempt.”
The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed, holding (a) McEuen waived a direct appeal of the Judgment of Acquittal denial but substantial evidence supported conviction, (b) Buhmann’s actions were within lawful performance and not excessive force, (c) the proffered self‑defense instructions misstated the law, and (d) no plain error in omitting special definitions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Lawful performance/excessive force	Officer’s grabbing/pinning was excessive force so he was not lawfully performing duties	Officer was lawfully performing duties given evasive behavior, walking away, refusal to ID	Court held officer’s actions were lawful; no excessive force shown
Sufficiency of evidence — intent to cause injury	McEuen lacked specific intent to cause bodily injury	Repeated kicking and resisting supports inference of specific intent	Court held evidence sufficient for specific intent; conviction stands
Denial of self‑defense instruction	Requested instructions were proper and necessary to present defense theory	Instructions misstated law: self‑defense against officer requires excessive force, not mere unlawful performance	Court affirmed refusal because proffered instructions misstate law
Failure to define “lawful performance” and “attempt”	Omission deprived jury of elements and was reversible error	Terms have ordinary meaning; no request at trial; no clear legal rule requiring definitions	Court found no plain error; definitions unnecessary and not required

Bruce v. State, 346 P.3d 909 (Wyo. 2015) (defendant’s presentation of evidence after a motion for judgment of acquittal waives appeal of denial)
Hawes v. State, 335 P.3d 1073 (Wyo. 2014) (standards for reviewing sufficiency of evidence)
Leavitt v. State, 245 P.3d 831 (Wyo. 2011) (specific intent may be inferred from conduct and circumstances)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (articulable facts justify police intrusion)
Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739 (Wyo. 1987) (self‑defense against police is limited by excessive‑force precondition)
Roberts v. State, 711 P.2d 1131 (Wyo. 1985) (police conduct may be so provocative that officer is not engaged in lawful performance)
Counts v. State, 277 P.3d 94 (Wyo. 2012) (instructional terms are given plain and ordinary meaning unless legislature indicates specialized meaning)
Masias v. State, 233 P.3d 944 (Wyo. 2010) (absence of statutory definition indicates no specialized meaning required)