Casie S. Rudisel v. State of Indiana
2015 Ind. App. LEXIS 379
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Casie S. Rudisel pleaded guilty to OWI as a Class D felony and received a three-year sentence suspended except for a 180-day direct commitment (home detention), followed by 915 days formal probation; sentence to run consecutive to another cause.
- The court later modified placement to work release; Rudisel failed to enter, was found in violation, and was ordered evaluated/placed in treatment and to complete remaining terms.
- Rudisel absconded from a treatment facility, was arrested, and in February 2013 the court revoked placement and found she had served 104 actual days in the county jail, then returned her to formal probation.
- In 2014 the State alleged further probation violations; Rudisel failed to appear for a 2014 hearing and a bench warrant was served. On September 4, 2014 the court revoked probation and ordered execution of the balance of the original sentence: 2.5 years in the DOC with credit for 5 actual days (but record/earlier order reflected 104 days credit).
- The Court of Appeals found the February 7, 2013 order’s 104 days of confinement (though not expressly labeled as credit) triggered the Robinson presumption that those days also served as credit time; combining prior credit (104 days) and the September 2014 5 days yields 218 days of total credit.
- Because imposing 2.5 years in DOC plus 218 days of credit would effectively exceed the statutory maximum for a Class D felony, the appellate court reversed and remanded with instructions to resentence within the statutory limit and to account correctly for credit time.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court abused its discretion in sentencing after probation revocation | State argued sentencing and credit calculation were proper; challenged appeal as inadequately supported and procedurally defective | Rudisel argued the court miscalculated jail-time and good-time credit (claimed 104 days previously served plus additional days) causing a total term exceeding the statutory maximum | Reversed and remanded: trial court must account for the 218 days of credit and resentence so the aggregate term does not exceed the statutory maximum for a Class D felony |
Key Cases Cited
- Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184 (Ind. 2007) (probation-revocation sentencing reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783 (Ind. 2004) (trial-court judgments must state pre-sentence confinement and credit time; missing credit time treated as equal to pre-sentence confinement)
- Washington v. State, 805 N.E.2d 795 (Ind. 2004) (applying Robinson presumption to award credit time equal to pre-sentence confinement)
- K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538 (Ind. 2006) (distinguishing subject-matter jurisdiction from procedural exhaustion)
- Murphy v. State, 942 N.E.2d 818 (Ind. 2011) (trial court as forum to determine certain credit-time claims)
- Buchanan v. State, 956 N.E.2d 124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (challenge to trial court credit-time calculation appropriate on direct appeal)
- McAllister v. State, 913 N.E.2d 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (reversing and remanding to correct credit time and sentence)