67 F.Supp.3d 45
D.D.C.2014Background
- Plaintiffs Paul and Abigail Casey sue under DC Wrongful Death Act and Survival Act for the death of Patrick Casey (Sept. 27, 2011).
- Defendants include Ward, Ruark, Giblin, and various bar defendants and M St. McDonald's; incident occurred on the night of Sept. 22–23, 2011 in Northwest DC.
- Casey allegedly was punched at the M St. McDonald's after a bar-hopping altercation, causing head trauma.
- Defendants allegedly served intoxicated individuals; the altercation preceded Casey’s injury.
- Plaintiffs discovered the cause and defendants’ identities on March 18, 2013 via MPD FOIA request.
- Court grants most motions to dismiss; only certain negligence survival claims against select defendants remain.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing under Wrongful Death Act | Paul, as personal representative, has standing; Abigail as heir has no wrongful death standing. | Non-personal representatives cannot bring wrongful death claims. | Paul is the personal representative; Abigail lacks standing for wrongful death claims. |
| Standing under Survival Act | Both Paul and Abigail satisfy legal representative for survival claims. | Only certain plaintiffs fit the legal representative definition. | Both Paul and Abigail satisfy the Survival Act’s broader definition to pursue survival claims. |
| Accrual and statutes of limitations | Claims accrued later, around 2013, within limitations. | Claims accrued in 2011; barred by limitations. | Wrongful death claims barred; survival claims timely as to negligence but barred for assault and battery against some defendants. |
| Wrongful Death Act retroactivity | 2012 amendments apply retroactively to timing. | Amendments apply prospectively only. | Wrongful Death Act of 2012 applied prospectively; one-year statute applicable; claims barred. |
| Failure to state a claim (negligence per se and causation) | Bar defendants’ violations caused injury; foreseeability. | Causation too attenuated; third-party intentional acts break proximate cause. | No proximate causal link; claims against bar defendants fail. |
Key Cases Cited
- Estate of Chapelle v. Sanders, 442 A.2d 157 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (tolling and identification of liable parties in wrongful death actions)
- Saunders v. Air Florida, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1233 (D.D.C. 1983) (standing for wrongful death claims; identification of liable parties)
- Strother v. District of Columbia, 372 A.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (broad definition of legal representative for Survival Act)
- Thomas v. Doyle, 187 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (definition of legal representatives; breadth to stand in decedent's place)
- Arrington v. District of Columbia, 673 A.2d 674 (D.C. 1996) (survival accrues on injury date, not death)
- Bailey v. District of Columbia, 668 A.2d 708 (D.C. 1991) (foreseeability standard for intervening criminal acts)
- Potts v. District of Columbia, 697 A.2d 1249 (D.C. 1997) (proximate cause when third-party criminal act intervenes)
- U.S. v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 276 U.S. 160 (1928) (presumption against retroactive statutory changes)
- Gersman v. Grp. Health Ass'n, 975 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (prospective application preferred in ambiguity)
- Rong Yao Zhou v. Jennifer Mall Rest., 534 A.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (public safety duty and negligence per se; proximate cause)