338 Conn. 479
Conn.2021Background
- Governor Ned Lamont declared a civil preparedness emergency (Mar. 10, 2020) under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 28-9 in response to COVID-19 and issued successive executive orders restricting on-premises service at bars and restaurants (e.g., Exec. Orders 7D, 7G, 7X, 7MM, 7ZZ).
- Plaintiffs Kristine Casey and Black Sheep Enterprise, LLC closed Casey’s Irish Pub (predominantly alcohol sales; outdoor service infeasible) and sued to enjoin enforcement, arguing the governor exceeded statutory authority and § 28-9 is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
- The Superior Court denied relief, finding COVID-19 is a “serious disaster” under § 28-9 and the challenged orders were authorized by § 28-9(b)(1) and (7).
- Plaintiffs appealed directly to the Connecticut Supreme Court under § 52-265a; the court issued a per curiam affirmance and then a full opinion.
- The Supreme Court held COVID-19 qualifies as a “serious disaster,” the governor’s orders modifying/suspending statutes and imposing health-related limits on restaurants/bars were authorized by § 28-9(b)(1) and (7), and § 28-9 does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority given statutory limits and oversight avenues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether COVID-19 is a “serious disaster” under § 28-9 so the governor may proclaim a civil preparedness emergency | COVID-19 (a disease contagion) is not the sort of event the legislature intended “serious disaster” to cover | The statutory text and legislative history support an expansive meaning; COVID-19 is a catastrophe/major disaster and thus a serious disaster when the governor declares an emergency | Held: COVID-19 qualifies as a "serious disaster," so the § 28-9 proclamation was lawful |
| Whether § 28-9(b)(1) and (7) unconstitutionally delegate legislative power (Conn. Const., art. II) | The provisions vest excessive, standardless authority in the governor, violating separation of powers | The statute declares legislative policy, imposes standards/limits (conflict with civil preparedness functions/public health; reasons required; six-month limit), and permits judicial and legislative checks | Held: § 28-9(b)(1) and (7) are constitutional; delegation is broad but sufficiently constrained and subject to judicial/legislative oversight |
Key Cases Cited
- Gould v. Freedom of Information Comm'n, 314 Conn. 802 (Conn. 2014) (standards for plenary statutory interpretation review)
- Sena v. American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc., 333 Conn. 30 (Conn. 2019) (statutory-construction principles for emergency/health statutes)
- University of Connecticut Chapter, AAUP v. Governor, 200 Conn. 386 (Conn. 1986) (upholding executive authority to administer budgetary and emergency measures; separation-of-powers analysis)
- New Milford v. SCA Servs. of Conn., Inc., 174 Conn. 146 (Conn. 1977) (legislature may delegate filling in details to executive/administrative bodies)
- Stoddard, 126 Conn. 623 (Conn. 1940) (invalid delegation where statute lacked adequate standards)
- Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (U.S. 1989) (permissible delegation if legislature provides an intelligible principle)
- Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (U.S. 2019) (framing modern intelligible-principle inquiry)
- South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (U.S. 2020) (Roberts concurrence emphasizing broad latitude for elected officials in pandemic responses)
- Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872 (Pa. 2020) (state supreme court holding pandemic can qualify as disaster under emergency statute)
- Beshear v. Acree, 615 S.W.3d 780 (Ky. 2020) (upholding governor emergency powers against separation-of-powers challenge)
- Elkhorn Baptist Church v. Brown, 366 Or. 506, 466 P.3d 30 (Or. 2020) (Oregon Supreme Court on limits and purposes of gubernatorial emergency powers)