Casey Dooley v. John Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366

In 2002 a jury found Casey Dooley "guilty but mentally ill" (GBMI); Dooley sought D Stability Code status in PA DOC, which affords the most intensive mental-health resources.
DOC officials told Dooley that a psychiatric evaluation and the sentencing court removed the GBMI designation from his final order and denied his grievances requesting D Code placement.
Dooley filed a pro se § 1983 complaint in state court alleging Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious mental-health needs by DOC officials; DOC removed the case to federal court.
The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal as frivolous and for failure to state a claim, without leave to amend; the District Court adopted the R&R, dismissed the complaint, and labeled the dismissal a PLRA "strike."
The Third Circuit agreed the complaint failed to state a § 1983 personal-involvement claim but held dismissal was not frivolous and remanded because the district court erred by (1) denying leave to amend without finding amendment futile or inequitable and (2) prospectively declaring the dismissal a § 1915(g) strike.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether complaint should have been dismissed without leave to amend for failure to state a § 1983 claim (personal involvement; Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference)	Dooley: his GBMI finding, sentencing judge's remark about psychiatric needs, and alleged mental-health symptoms plausibly show a serious medical need and defendants' awareness; he should get leave to amend	DOC: complaint lacks allegations of defendants' personal direction or actual knowledge and thus fails to state a claim	Third Circuit: complaint failed to plead personal involvement so dismissal on the merits was permissible, but the complaint was not frivolous and district court abused discretion by denying leave to amend without finding futility or inequity; remand to allow amendment
Whether the district court could, at dismissal, designate the dismissal a PLRA "strike" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)	Dooley: district court lacked authority to prospectively label dismissal a strike; his complaint was originally filed in state court	DOC: courts may make strike determinations at dismissal and this one was proper	Third Circuit: § 1915(g) contemplates counting prior dismissals when a prisoner files a later federal IFP action; a district court may not prospectively declare a strike at dismissal (not ripe) and here the suit was filed in state court so it did not count under § 1915(g)

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (establishes Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard for medical care)
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (deliberate indifference requires actual knowledge of substantial risk)
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1988) (§ 1983 liability requires personal involvement; no respondeat superior)
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (frivolous suits standard for IFP dismissals)
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2002) (leave to amend required under PLRA unless amendment futile or inequitable)
Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523 (3d Cir. 2003) (standard for deeming an IFP complaint frivolous)
Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 2017) (mental-health symptoms can establish a serious medical need)
Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655 (3d Cir. 2019) (prisoner "brought an action" when he tenders complaint to court for PLRA purposes)
Deleon v. Doe, 361 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2004) (PLRA strike determination is ripe only when a later IFP filing occurs)
Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464 (7th Cir. 1998) (ripeness and PLRA strike considerations)