Casey Demon Carmon v. State
456 S.W.3d 594
Tex. App.2014Background
- Appellant Casey Carmon (17 at time of offense) participated in a convenience-store robbery during which two clerks were shot and killed; he was indicted for capital murder (multiple murders in same transaction).
- Carmon was already serving a 99-year sentence for an unrelated aggravated robbery when police interviewed him at the jail; the recorded final 15 minutes included a Miranda/Article 38.22 waiver and statements implicating him.
- At trial the jury convicted Carmon of capital murder; the trial court assessed punishment at life imprisonment (not life without parole) in light of Miller v. Alabama and later granted the State’s motion to cumulate this life sentence with the earlier 99-year sentence.
- Carmon moved to suppress his custodial statement, claiming it was involuntary and that he had asked to stop the interview; the trial court credited the officer’s testimony and denied suppression.
- On appeal Carmon raised six issues: (1) trial court lacked authority to impose life (statute then mandated life without parole), (2) cumulation to create a de facto life-without-parole violates Eighth Amendment/Miller, (3) double jeopardy from use of the later offense in prior punishment, (4–5) suppression denial was error, and (6) insufficient evidence of intent to support capital murder.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Carmon) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authority to impose life (statutory timing) | Sentence to life was unauthorized at sentencing because statute then provided life without parole as sole non-death punishment for capital felony | Legislature later amended §12.31 to conform to Miller and made change retroactive to pending appeals, curing any defect | Overruled — no remand; legislative amendment applies to appeals and corrects any error |
| Cumulation creates de facto LWOP violating Miller | Consecutive 99-year + life effectively denies parole, replicating juvenile LWOP prohibited by Miller | Cumulation was discretionary (not mandatory scheme); trial court considered Miller factors and presided over both trials | Overruled — cumulation did not violate Miller; record reflects court considered Miller factors |
| Double jeopardy (use of later offense at prior punishment phase) | Prior jury heard evidence of the later murders at punishment for aggravated robbery, so prosecuting/litigating the murder later punishes him twice | Double jeopardy allows consideration of extraneous offenses at sentencing; convictions and multiple punishments for different offenses are permitted | Overruled — no double jeopardy violation; courts permit extraneous-offense consideration at sentencing |
| Suppression / voluntariness of confession | Statement was involuntary/coerced; Carmon asked to stop interview and was told he could not return to cell; threats of death penalty coerced waiver | Trial court found officer credible, disbelieved Carmon, found no threats or coercion; officer gave Miranda warnings and Carmon waived | Overruled — trial court did not abuse discretion in denying suppression (credibility findings deferred) |
| Sufficiency of evidence for intent (capital murder) | Evidence shows accidental shooting/aiming away; lacks proof of intent to kill both victims | Witness testimony, autopsy, and statements support that Carmon shot multiple times, including a chest shot after pushing victim away; jury resolved conflicts | Overruled — evidence sufficient for intentional/knowing killings; conviction stands |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment; sentencer must consider youth-related factors)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Eighth Amendment bars life without parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (Eighth Amendment prohibits death penalty for crimes committed as a juvenile)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- Ex parte Broxton, 888 S.W.2d 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (double jeopardy does not bar consideration of extraneous offenses at sentencing)
- Barrow v. State, 207 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (sentencing and decision to cumulate sentences are normative/discretionary processes)