Casey Birkley v. State of Mississippi, 203 So. 3d 689

On Jan. 20, 2014, cashier Erica Wallace was robbed at gunpoint at an Exxon in Greenville; the robber asked for cigars, pointed a gun, and took about $46. Surveillance video captured the incident.
Officer Desmond Washington identified the suspect from a still image of the surveillance video and had previously stopped the defendant the night before; Wallace also identified Birkley from a photo lineup.
Birkley was tried, convicted of armed robbery, and sentenced as a habitual offender to life without parole. He appealed arguing improper admission of prior convictions and admission of testimonial hearsay by a non-testifying officer.
Before trial the State sought to introduce two prior armed-robbery convictions as evidence of a common plan/modus operandi; the trial court admitted the prior-conviction evidence over a motion in limine.
At trial, one investigating officer testified about another officer’s identification as part of the investigative steps (admitted without objection); another investigator testified in a way that conveyed the out-of-court identification, to which defense counsel objected.
The Court of Appeals found the prior-conviction evidence inadmissible under M.R.E. 404(b) (not a distinctive "signature" modus operandi) and also found the non-testifying-officer identification testimony was hearsay that constituted plain error; the conviction was reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Issue	Birkley’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
Admission of prior armed-robbery convictions under M.R.E. 404(b)	Prior convictions were prejudicial, not distinctive, and should be excluded as propensity evidence	Prior robberies showed a consistent pattern/modus operandi (plan, preparation, identity) and were admissible	Reversed: trial court abused discretion; prior-acts lacked the distinctive "signature" necessary to prove identity and were more prejudicial than probative
Testimony about non-testifying officer’s identification (hearsay/Confrontation)	Testimony recounting Officer Washington’s ID was hearsay and violated the Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses	Some officer statements were admissible to explain investigation; prosecution argued identification supported identity	Mixed: part of the testimony (as investigatory explanation) was non-hearsay, but Investigator O’Neal’s testimony and related prosecutorial argument conveyed Washington’s identification as proof and was improper hearsay (plain error); court did not separately resolve the Confrontation Clause claim because reversal was warranted on other grounds

Stone v. State, 94 So. 3d 1078 (Miss. 2012) (trial-court abuse-of-discretion review for admission of prejudicial evidence)
Burrell v. State, 727 So. 2d 761 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998) (prior-crimes admissible only when similarity marks them as handiwork of accused)
Segundo v. State, 270 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (discussing modus operandi/signature-crime analysis)
State v. Jones, 450 S.W.3d 866 (Tenn. 2014) (signature-crime test: peculiar and distinctive method required)
Fullilove v. State, 101 So. 3d 669 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (out-of-court statements to police admissible to explain investigative steps)
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004) (testimonial statements of absent witnesses barred unless prior opportunity for cross-examination)