Casey A. Koehler and Jennifer Phy, as Administratrix of the Estate of Evelyn Landua Koehler v. Kanda Koehler
03-14-00035-CV
| Tex. App. | Dec 18, 2015Background
- Evelyn Koehler died December 28, 2008, leaving a May 29, 2001 will and a handwritten (holographic) codicil dated November 24, 2008 that was never revoked.
- The codicil (in decedent’s handwriting) modifies distribution to John L. Koehler and Charles F. Koehler; appellee (Kanda Koehler) is not a beneficiary of either instrument.
- The original codicil was placed with the county clerk by appellants; appellee did not receive a copy until June 2012 and never possessed the original.
- Appellants offered the will (but not the codicil) for probate; John L. Koehler was involved, then died in April 2012; appellee was appointed administratrix of John’s estate in April 2013.
- Appellee sought and obtained court permission to file the codicil and filed an application to probate it on August 27, 2013—more than four years after decedent’s death.
- The trial court admitted the holographic codicil to probate, found appellee was not in default for filing after four years, and concluded appellee lacked standing to offer the codicil until she was appointed administratrix of John’s estate.
Issues
| Issue | Appellants' Argument | Appellee's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the codicil can be admitted more than four years after death absent proof the proponent was not in default | Appellants contend the codicil was offered too late and proponent (through predecessor) was in default | Appellee argues she showed reasonable diligence under the circumstances and was not in default because she lacked notice/possession and lacked standing until appointed administratrix | Trial court: proponent (appellee) was not in default; codicil admitted |
| Whether a predecessor’s (John’s) alleged default can be imputed to appellee | Appellants assert John’s failure to probate before death creates a default that bars appellee | Appellee argues trial court made no finding John was in default and, in any event, Campbell v. reasoning precludes imputing another’s default to a non-defaulting proponent | Trial court: no finding John in default; default not imputed; appellee not barred |
| Standard of review for default and probate admissibility | Appellants challenge findings (unclear whether legal or factual sufficiency) | Appellee: findings of fact reviewed for legal and factual sufficiency; proponent bears burden to show lack of default | Appellate standard: bench findings reviewed for legal and factual sufficiency; evidence supported trial court findings |
| Whether admission would work an injustice or frustrate decedent’s intent | Appellants implied admission would be unjust or contrary to intent | Appellee argued admission effectuates decedent’s intent and would not work injustice | Trial court found admission would not work an injustice and would carry out decedent’s intent |
Key Cases Cited
- Armstrong v. Carter, 291 S.W. 626 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1927) (trial court decides default issue; courts have permitted late probate where probative evidence excuses delay)
- Schindler v. Schindler, 119 S.W.3d 923 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003) (held an heir’s default may bar successors; court criticized in later authority)
- In the Estate of Campbell, 343 S.W.3d 899 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011) (rejects broad rule of imputing another’s default; permits non-defaulting proponent to probate after four years if no injustice and proponent shows diligence)
- In the Estate of Rothrock, 312 S.W.3d 271 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2010) (discusses default as question of fact for trial court)
- Brown v. Byrd, 512 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1974) (defines default as failure due to lack of reasonable diligence)
- City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (legal-sufficiency review principles applied to appellate review of bench findings)