CASA, Inc. v. Noem
8:25-cv-01484
| D. Maryland | Jul 10, 2025Background
- In May–June 2025 DHS published Federal Register notices terminating TPS for Afghanistan (May 13, effective July 14) and Cameroon (June 4, effective Aug. 4). Secretary Noem signed internal decision memoranda approving those terminations prior to the notices.
- CASA, an immigrant-rights nonprofit with members from both countries, sued DHS and Secretary Noem under the APA, the Declaratory Judgment Act, and the Fifth Amendment (equal protection), seeking (among other relief) automatic six‑month extensions triggered by an alleged failure to meet the TPS timing rule and a stay of the terminations.
- Central statutory provisions: 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3) (periodic review, publication requirement, automatic 6‑month extension if no determination is made), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A) (no judicial review of TPS determinations), and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) (injunctive-relief limitations) — all disputed.
- CASA also alleges the terminations were produced by a preordained administration policy to reduce non‑white immigration (citing presidential statements, executive orders, agency process departures, and record inconsistencies), raising APA arbitrary-and-capricious and equal protection claims.
- The Court denied CASA’s motion for partial summary judgment or a stay, and denied DHS’s motions to dismiss / for summary judgment — allowing CASA’s timing, APA, and constitutional claims to proceed (while resolving certain threshold statutory interpretations).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A) bars judicial review | §1254a(b)(5)(A) does not bar review of general policies or constitutional claims; only individual determinations | The provision is an absolute bar to judicial review of TPS designation/termination/extension determinations | Court: §1254a(b)(5)(A) bars review of individual TPS determinations but does not bar challenges to general DHS policies/practices or colorable constitutional claims. |
| Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) precludes relief | §1252(f)(1) does not apply because TPS statute is in Part V (adjustment/status) and not in Part IV (removal); in any event it does not bar vacatur/declaratory relief | §1252(f)(1) bars injunctions and should preclude CASA’s requested relief | Court: §1252(f)(1) does not bar the suit; TPS falls outside the Part IV injunction bar, and §1252(f)(1) in any event does not eliminate all forms of judicial relief (vacatur/declaratory relief remain available). |
| Whether a late Federal Register publication automatically triggers a 6‑month extension under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(C) | Publication must occur at least 60 days before expiration; late publication triggers automatic 6‑month extension | Only the Secretary’s determination must be made ≥60 days before expiration; publication need only occur “on a timely basis,” so late publication does not trigger automatic extension if the determination itself was timely | Court: Adopts DHS’s textual reading — the 60‑day deadline applies to the internal determination; publication timing is a separate, more flexible requirement. But disputed factual issues (redactions, whether determinations were in fact made timely) preclude summary judgment for either side. |
| Whether CASA has a viable APA / equal protection claim that terminations were preordained or race‑motivated | Terminations were driven by a preordained White House policy to reduce non‑white immigration (statements, Executive Orders, process shortcuts, record inconsistencies) making DHS action arbitrary and discriminatory | DHS denies improper motive and contends the terminations were lawful exercises of statutory discretion | Court: CASA has plausibly pleaded APA and constitutional claims challenging a general policy/practice; claims survive dismissal and summary judgment is premature — factual development required. |
Key Cases Cited
- McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991) (statutory bar of "a determination" reaches individual acts but does not necessarily preclude collateral challenges to general procedures or policies).
- Reno v. Catholic Social Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43 (1993) (same interpretive distinction: statutory language barring review of a determination does not bar challenges to regulations or general practices that can be litigated without attacking a single application).
- Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (heightened presumption favoring review of colorable constitutional claims; statutory preclusion must be clear and convincing).
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (arbitrary-and-capricious review: agency cannot rely on factors Congress did not intend).
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard: claim must be plausible to survive dismissal).
- Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (preliminary‑injunction/stay factors: likelihood of success, irreparable harm, balance of equities, public interest).
