Cary, Stacy Stine
PD-1341-14
| Tex. App. | Jul 6, 2015Background
- Stacy Stine Cary was convicted by a Collin County jury of eight counts: one count of engaging in organized criminal activity (EOCA), six counts of bribery, and one count of money laundering; sentenced to ten years’ probation with 30 days jail and fines.
- The State’s theory: Cary paid campaign operative James Stephen-Spencer $150,000 in six transfers in early 2008 (purportedly for consulting) intending the funds to influence then-candidate Judge Suzanne Wooten to obtain favorable judicial rulings in pending family-law litigation involving Cary’s husband.
- Defense at trial: the payments were legitimate consulting fees under a 2007 contract; Cary had no knowledge Spencer used funds to support Wooten’s campaign.
- Evidence against Cary included timing and size of transfers, delayed/limited work product from Spencer, chain-of-communications and bank records linking transfers to campaign disbursements, lack of campaign reporting or loans listing Cary, and conduct showing Cary’s active involvement in litigation.
- Dallas Court of Appeals (divided) affirmed convictions; one justice dissented. Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review on four questions about sufficiency and statutory interpretation (bribery vs. political contributions, bilateral agreement requirement, intent, and sufficiency for EOCA/money laundering).
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Cary's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State was required to disprove that payments were "political contributions" (Pen. Code §36.02(d)) | Jury could reasonably find Cary did not intend payments as political contributions; Cary is estopped from demanding the heightened §36.02(a)(4) instruction because her trial theory denied they were contributions | Payments were effectively political contributions; without negating that exception the bribery proofs fail | Court affirmed: a rational juror could find payments were not political contributions and Cary cannot now claim error in jury not instructed on heightened political-contribution rule (invited error) |
| Whether proof of a bilateral agreement (quid pro quo meeting of minds) was required for bribery | Bribery as charged is inchoate: offering/confer/agree to confer a benefit with corrupt intent suffices; no proof of bilateral agreement or acceptance required | Bribery requires proof of an illegal contract or mutual understanding with the public official (McCallum reading) | Court affirmed: proof of an offer/transfer with corrupt intent can suffice; bilateral agreement/actual acceptance not required under alternative statutory theories charged |
| Whether evidence showed Cary had requisite corrupt intent to commit bribery | Circumstantial evidence (timing, amounts, sham contract, communications, lack of reporting, post-election actions) supports a reasonable inference Cary intended to influence judicial outcomes; jury properly resolved credibility | Evidence is equally consistent with lawful consulting payments or hope for better rulings (insufficient to prove bribery beyond reasonable doubt) | Court affirmed under Jackson standard: viewing evidence in favor of verdict, jurors reasonably inferred corrupt intent; appellate reweighing not permitted |
| Whether evidence sufficed for EOCA and money laundering (predicated on bribery) | If bribery is supported, EOCA and money-laundering convictions follow from those predicate acts and record linking transfers and laundering activity | Without sufficient bribery evidence, the predicate fails and EOCA/money laundering cannot stand | Court affirmed: because bribery sufficiency upheld, convictions for EOCA and money laundering are supported |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (sets the sole federal standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence—view evidence in light most favorable to the verdict)
- McCallum v. State, 686 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (case discussing requirements for bribery proof; distinguishing fact patterns where indictment pled only acceptance)
- Martinez v. State, 696 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. App.—Austin 1985) (interpreting bribery statute as encompassing inchoate acts—offers or solicitations suffice without proving completed bilateral agreement)
- Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (verdict will be upheld if evidence is sufficient under any one of the theories submitted in the jury charge)
- Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (clarifies that Jackson sufficiency is the only standard to use in criminal sufficiency review)