140 F.4th 335
6th Cir.2025Background
- Plaintiffs, Tennessee inmates, challenged the state's parole process, alleging a due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment due to reliance on the STRONG-R computer risk assessment tool.
- STRONG-R scores are used by the Board of Parole to evaluate parole eligibility; a "Moderate" or "High" score generally results in parole denial.
- Plaintiffs claimed the STRONG-R scores were often based on inaccurate or incomplete information and inmates had no meaningful way to challenge or correct errors.
- Prior versions of Tennessee's parole scheme included a presumption of release, but current statutes define parole as a privilege and give the Board broad discretion.
- The district court dismissed the case (Rule 12(b)(6)), finding Tennessee inmates lack a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed this dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether TN parole scheme confers a protected liberty interest | Past rules/statutory language & customs create expectation of parole | Statutory language makes parole discretionary | No liberty interest in parole under current law |
| Whether procedural due process was violated by STRONG-R's use | STRONG-R's errors deny meaningful process | No right to parole exists, so due process not implicated | Process sufficed; no protected liberty interest |
| Effect of Board's customs and practices on creation of liberty interest | Board's practices create expectation of parole | Only statutes/regulations control | Customs do not create a constitutionally protected interest |
| Impact of prior statutes or rules on current statutory interpretation | Old rules created entitlement | Current statutes control; old rules are irrelevant | Current parole scheme lacks entitlement creating language |
Key Cases Cited
- Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (set standard that a liberty interest in parole arises only if statute creates a legitimate expectation of release)
- Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987) (mandatory statutory language can create a liberty interest in parole)
- Mayes v. Trammell, 751 F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1984) (Tennessee’s former parole rules once created a liberty interest)
- Wright v. Trammell, 810 F.2d 589 (6th Cir. 1987) (removal of presumption language in TN rules ended liberty interest in parole)