Carvajal v. Drug Enforcement Administration
286 F.R.D. 23
D.D.C.2012Background
- Plaintiff Jamie A. Carvajal, a prisoner, sued multiple federal agencies under FOIA in Dec 29, 2006, including the DEA, FBI, IRS, Treasury, ATF, the then-Attorney General, and a supposed FOIA/Privacy agency; he sought material allegedly withheld under FOIA.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment on Nov 25, 2008, arguing (a) DEA properly withheld records under FOIA exemptions; (b) other agencies had not received FOIA requests; (c) the Attorney General is not a proper defendant; (d) the purported FOIA agency does not exist.
- Plaintiff did not respond to the summary judgment motion; the court directed a response; plaintiff remained non-responsive; court granted summary judgment on June 10, 2009 under Local Civ. Rule 7(b).
- Plaintiff moved to reinstate the case on Nov 29, 2011, alleging “diesel therapy” (frequent prison transfers) caused denial of access to legal mail and documents until late 2009.
- BOP records show extensive transfers from Feb 2007 to Aug 2009, culminating at FCI El Reno; plaintiff’s personal property and legal papers were delayed, and documents were confiscated on July 20, 2010, hindering his ability to participate.
- The court treated the motion as a Rule 60(b) request for relief from judgment and denied reinstatement, holding the motion untimely and the delay unjustified; judgment remained in place.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the motion should be treated as Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). | Carvajal seeks relief due to mail access issues and delays in law‑document receipt. | The motion should be construed as Rule 60(b) moving for relief from judgment. | Constitution of the motion as Rule 60(b) is appropriate. |
| Whether the Rule 60(b) motion was filed within a reasonable time after judgment. | Delay was due to prison transfers and mail issues, not fault. | Motion filed ~25 months after judgment is outside a reasonable time. | Motion untimely under Rule 60(c)(1) given the lengthy delay. |
| Whether extraordinary circumstances or faultless delay justify relief. | Delay due to diesel therapy and access issues constitutes extraordinary circumstances. | No extraordinary circumstances shown for the ten months after arrival at El Reno and before confiscation. | No extraordinary circumstances; relief denied. |
| Whether Rule 60(b) relief should be granted under the circumstances. | Relief warranted to reinstate case for denial of access to legal mail. | Relief not warranted; final judgment should stand. | Rule 60(b)(6) relief denied; motion denied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates, Ltd., 507 U.S. 380 (1993) (reaffirms that Rule 60(b) relief is extraordinary and must be timely.)
- Williams v. Capital Transit Co., 215 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (timeliness and notice considerations for post-judgment relief.)
- Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1981) (discusses timely filing under Rule 60(b) with notice considerations.)
- Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1951) (addressed timely filing and reasonable time for Rule 60(b).)
- United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1993) (considerations for timely relief under Rule 60(b).)
- In re Sealed Case (Bowles), 624 F.3d 482 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (guidance on evaluating timely filing and prejudice under Rule 60(b).)
- Erick Rios Bridoux v. Eastern Air Lines, 214 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (early Rule 60(b) timeliness considerations in D.C. Circuit context.)
- Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters. v. Smithsonian Inst., 500 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (prejudice and reasonable time factors in determining timeliness.)
- McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993) (pro se litigation duties; not directly a Rule 60(b) case but relevant to procedural posture.)