320 Conn. 315
Conn.2016Background
- Mark Development, LLC purchased a ~48‑acre parcel in Meriden zoned "Regional Development District," where only a limited set of uses (hotels, executive offices, R&D, medical centers, colleges, distribution with offices) are permitted by right.
- In 2008 Mark sought a variance to operate a used car dealership, claiming the zoning restrictions amounted to a "practical confiscation" of the property.
- At a public hearing the Zoning Board of Appeals granted the variance (4–1). The city and private landowners appealed to the trial court.
- The trial court found substantial evidence supported practical confiscation but remanded because a board member should have disqualified himself for a conflict of interest.
- The Appellate Court reversed, holding Mark failed to prove practical confiscation because it presented no evidence of current property value, diminution in value since purchase, or concrete efforts to market/sell/develop for permitted uses.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court, holding the record lacked substantial evidence that the zoning deprived the property of all reasonable use or value.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether substantial evidence supported the board's finding of practical confiscation (i.e., deprivation of all reasonable use/value) | The board lacked evidence to show the property was practically confiscated; variance should be overturned | Zoning restrictions drastically reduced the property’s value and effectively confiscated it, justifying a variance | Held for plaintiffs: Mark failed to prove property had no reasonable use or lost all value under the zoning; substantial evidence did not support confiscation finding |
| Whether evidence of diminution in market value (since purchase) is required to prove practical confiscation | Lack of value evidence fatal here; plaintiffs relied on absence of proof | Mark argued Appellate Court improperly created categorical rule requiring proof of diminution since purchase | Held: No categorical rule created; but here absence of reliable evidence of current value, marketing efforts, or inability to use for permitted purposes meant confiscation not shown |
| Whether the property’s market conditions for some permitted uses sufficed to establish confiscation | Plaintiffs: market difficulties for some uses do not prove loss of all reasonable uses | Mark: unfavorable market for executive offices and R&D shows de facto confiscation | Held: Even if some permitted uses lack demand, other permitted uses (hotel, medical center, college, distribution) remained plausible; evidence insufficient to show no reasonable uses |
| Whether hardship claim can rest solely on zoning constraints without proof of unique property characteristics or owner’s marketing efforts | Plaintiffs: burden on applicant to present evidence of unique hardship, fitness, and marketing efforts | Mark: zoning limitations themselves create unusual hardship warranting variance | Held: Hardship cannot rest only on zoning; applicant must show peculiar property characteristics, inability to use or market for permitted uses, and not self‑created hardship; Mark did not meet burden |
Key Cases Cited
- Municipal Funding, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 270 Conn. 447 (establishing substantial‑evidence review for zoning board decisions)
- Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 233 Conn. 198 (variance as permission to act otherwise prohibited by zoning)
- Libby v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 143 Conn. 46 (loss of value can constitute hardship when property is rendered practically worthless)
- Dolan v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 156 Conn. 426 (variance standards; need evidence of inability to make any reasonable use and that effect is confiscatory)
- Rural Water Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 287 Conn. 282 (no practical confiscation where reasonable use remained)
- Verrillo v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 155 Conn. App. 657 (discussion of intersection between zoning variance and takings principles)