Carter v. The City of Alton, 32 N.E.3d 1129

Background

Four Illinois home-rule cities (Edwardsville, Alton, Collinsville, Granite City) adopted ordinances imposing administrative fees ($100–$500 tiers) when vehicles are towed/impounded in connection with arrests (including DUI).
Plaintiffs (each arrested for DUI and charged the level‑1 fee) sued each city, alleging the ordinances are facially invalid under substantive due process because the fees do not reasonably relate to actual administrative costs.
Defendants moved to dismiss under ILCCP §§ 2‑615 and 2‑619, attaching studies and memoranda asserting municipal costs tied to DUI arrests and impoundments; trial court granted dismissal relying in part on People v. Ratliff.
On appeal the Fifth District reviewed de novo, applying the rational‑basis standard for fee challenges and noting the distinction between fees (compensatory) and fines (punitive/deterrent).
The court held dismissal at the pleading stage was improper because plaintiffs’ facial challenge plausibly alleged the fees lack a reasonable relationship to actual, unique impoundment costs and factual development is needed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether municipal impoundment "administrative fees" violate substantive due process because they do not reasonably relate to actual administrative costs	Fees are facially invalid; amount charged bears no reasonable relationship to actual costs (allege only minimal administrative work for release)	Fees are compensatory and reasonably related to costs of DUI‑related arrests, towing, inventory, booking, incarceration; studies support reasonableness	Denied dismissal; factual record required to determine whether fees reasonably relate to actual, unique impoundment costs
Whether defendants pleaded an affirmative defense (failure to exhaust administrative remedies) that defeats the suits	Plaintiffs: facial challenge, so exhaustion not required	Defendants: plaintiffs did not exhaust administrative remedies	Court: exhaustion defense inapplicable to facial challenge; no affirmative matter barring claims
Whether prior precedent upholds these charges as a matter of law (Ratliff, Jaudon, Towers, Jackson)	Plaintiffs: those cases do not decide the fees‑vs‑costs relationship in this posture; distinct issues	Defendants: those cases validate similar impoundment charges and support dismissal	Court: those cases distinguishable; none resolves the specific compensatory‑relationship question here; Ratliff not controlling
Whether dismissal on pleadings was appropriate given defendants’ attached evidence (cost studies, memos)	Plaintiffs: cannot resolve factual disputes at pleading stage; discovery needed	Defendants: submitted evidence showing costs, supporting rational basis and justifying dismissal	Court: evidence disputed; pleadings must be viewed in plaintiffs’ favor; remand for factual development

Key Cases Cited

People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569 (distinguishes fees (compensatory) from fines (punitive); fee must reasonably relate to costs)
People v. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d 174 (rational‑basis standard for ordinances when no fundamental right implicated)
People v. Ratliff, 282 Ill. App. 3d 707 (2d Dist.) (held $500 impound charge was not so divorced from compensatory purpose as to be punitive; relied on by trial court but not deemed controlling)
People v. Jaudon, 307 Ill. App. 3d 427 (upheld $500 impound penalty under due process/eighth amendment analysis for fines; focused on punitive/deterrent rationale)
Towers v. City of Chicago, 173 F.3d 619 (7th Cir.) (analyzed $500 vehicle penalty as punitive/deterrent; rejected excessive‑fines and innocent‑owner due process challenges)
United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (U.S. Sup. Ct.) (relevant standard for when a civil sanction is considered punitive for double jeopardy/distinctions between punishment and civil regulatory/compensatory measures)
People v. Gildart, 377 Ill. App. 3d 39 (discusses broader authority to impose fines than fees and relates fee/fine distinctions)